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NOTES
EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF CONFISCATORY DECREES*
FOR twenty-two years, as a result of the spectacular Soviet nationalization
program, the application of foreign confiscatory decrees to property held in
this country has been argued and re-argued before American tribunals. At
first the courts were mainly concerned with the non-recognition policy of the
United States Government. But when in 1933 this policy was finally aban-
doned, they encountered a new difficulty: the interpretation of the combined
effects of recognition and the simultaneously executed Litvinoff assignment.1
By this instrument Soviet Russia assigned all her claims against American
nationals to the Federal Government, as a prelude to a still uncompleted
settlement of the debts owed American creditors by the Soviet.
2
Although earlier litigation has raised the issues posed by recognition and
the Litvinoff assignment,3 the recent case of The Moscow Fire Insurance
Company v. Bank of New York and Trust Company 4 is the first which has
had a full trial on the merits. Several years after the property of the Moscow
Fire Insurance Company had been confiscated by Soviet decree, its branch
in New York was liquidated pursuant to the New York Insurance Law.5
A portion of the securities on deposit with the Superintendent of Insurance,
in accordance with regulations designed to protect domestic policy holders
and creditors, 6 was used to pay these debts and to satisfy the attachment
liens acquired by foreign or domestic creditors before liquidation. Retaining
control of the remainder, the New York Court of Appeals invited the unpaid
* Moscow Fire Insurance Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 286,
20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939).
1. For the complete text of these agreements, see (Supp. 1934) 28 Ali. J. INT. L.,
Official Documents No. 1, pp. 1-11. For a history of the negotiations, see Sack, Diplo-
inatic Claints Against the Soviets (19i8-.r938) (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rsv. 507, (1939)
16 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray. 253.
2. It is intended that funds recovered as a result of the Litvinoff assignment will
be made available, in whole or in part, to American private claimants. See letter from
the Department of State in brief for the Association of American Creditors of Russia as
amicus curiae, pp. 8-9, Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280
N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939).
3. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937); Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. United States, 304 U. S. 126 (1938) ; United States v. Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y.
396, 12 N. E. (2d) 518 (1938); Bettman v. Northern Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 341, 16
N. E. (2d) 472 (1938).
4. 280 N. Y. 286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758 (1939), aff'g 253 App. Div. 644, 3 N. Y. S.
(2d) 653 (1st Dep't 1938); aff'g 161 Misc. 903, 294 N. Y. Supp. 648 (Sup. Ct. 1937),
(1938) 13 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 163, (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 116.
5. N. Y. INs. LAW § 63.
6. N. Y. INs. LAW § 27.
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creditors,7 none of whom were American nationals, to file claims founded
on business with the parent corporation in pre-Soviet Russia. While the
determination of these issues was still pending, the United States announced
its recognition policy. It then intervened in this action as assignee of the
Soviet Government,8 asserting that the Soviet had become the successor to
the MIoscow Fire Insurance Company's rights in the fund by virtue of the
confiscatory decrees, which the American courts were now obliged to recog-
nize as the mandates of a lawful sovereign.0 The Court of Appeals, in an
opinion by Judge Lehman to which three members dissented, rejected this
argument and ordered that the distribution to foreign creditors and stock-
holders continue.
The decision is founded on the proposition that the Soviet Government
had no rights in the fund, and therefore had nothing to assign. 10 In reaching
this conclusion, Judge Lehman asserted that while extraterritorial applica-
tion may have been intended for decrees nationalizing ordinary industrial and
commercial property, no such intent either express or implied may be dis-
covered in those separately issued confiscatory decrees which related to
insurance businesses." Furthermore, even if such an intent existed, it could
not affect the title to local property. Particularly is this true of insurance
companies, over which the state exercises extraordinary jurisdiction by virtue
of its police power.' 2 As a condition of doing business, in fact, securities must
be deposited with the Superintendent of Insurance in an amount sufficient
7. 'Matter of People (Moscow Fire Ins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 415, 433, 175 N. E. 114,
120 (1931).
S. It had tried to institute a separate proceeding in the federal courts, but the latter
could not disturb the state court's control of the fund awaiting distribution. United
States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463 (1936). The chose in action
which it gained by assignment arose only at recognition, when Soviet Russia gained th2
privilege to sue in American courts. Compare Russian Scecialist Federated Soviet Repub-
lic v% Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923) with Union of Socialist Soviet
Republics v. National City Bank, 257 App. Div. 302, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 236 (1st Dep't
1939).
9. Recognition operates retroactively, thus giving all previous decrees of the recog-
nized government the character of law. Underhill v. Hernandez, 163 U. S. 250 (1897) ;
see (1935) 20 fmm. L. REv. 95. Probably as the result of an erroneous obiter dictum
in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918), this principle has ben dis-
torted into a doctrine that recognition "validates," i.e., stamps with approval, all such
laws retroactively. See Moore, The Now, Isolation (1933) 27 A,s. J. I::v. L. 607, 617.
Cf. note.23 infra.
10. Under one interpretation, the Litvinoff assignment affected only claims owed by
American nationals directly to the U. S. S. R. or its predecessor governments and did
not cover claims that might be obtained through confiscation of the property of Russian
nationals. The referee saw no validity in this contention. See Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bank of New York & Trust Co., 161 Misc. 903, 910, 294 N. Y. Supp. 648, M30 (Sup. Ct.
1937). The Court of Appeals did not consider the question. But see United States v.
Bank of New York & Trust Co., 10 F. Supp. 269 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
11. Intervener's Exhibits 7, 11. Record in the principal case, pp. 1340, 1353. Cf.
First Russian Ins. Co. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., [1923] Ch. Div. 9M.
12. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2,2 U. S. 251 (1931), 31 CoL
L. REv. 498.
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to constitute the "capital" of the branch office within the state "for all pur-
poses." 13 Thus the branch is set up in New York as a "complete and
separate organization." 14
But Judge Lehman's argument that the assets of a branch insurance busi-
ness are peculiarly subject to the laws of New York proves nothing in this
case. The Superintendent of Insurance fulfilled his statutory obligation when
he had satisfied the claims of domestic creditors and policy holders. 15 The
New York courts have retained equitable jurisdiction over the remaining
assets not because of any unique quality attaching to insurance funds, but
merely because the surplus happens to remain on deposit in New York.
If the parent company were liquidated at its domicile, these assets would
be turned over to the foreign liquidator without question. 10 Although con-
fiscation is not liquidation 1 7 the surplus is none the less foreign property;
the state has no right to these funds by escheat or otherwise.18 Thus, while
the "separate entity" concept might be relevant if the Soviet Government
or its assignee were asserting rights in the original deposit, it is wholly un-
availing in an action to recover the surplus.
An unspoken premise underlying the decision in the Moscow case may
have been the settled conflict of laws rule that a sovereign has no power
to legislate extraterritorially. Since foreign laws are given effect only on
the principle of comity, rights existing under them are not enforced when
repugnant to the "public policy" of the forum.19 On this basis courts both
here and abroad have in general denied the Soviet confiscatory decrees
13. N. Y. INs. LAW § 27. Cf. § 104 of the new Insurance Law, effective January 1,
1940.
14. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 286, 309,
20 N. E. (2d) 758, 767 (1939). Cf. Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242
N. Y. 148, 159, 151 N. E. 159, 162 (1926); N. Y. INS. REPORT (1915) pt. I, 10.
The New York courts are not literal in their separate entity argument, as their
alacrity in acknowledging the right of the foreign directors and stockholders to maintain
suit well illustrates. Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170
N. E. 479 (1930) (before recognition); Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co.,
263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934) (after recognition). But cf. Russian Reins. Co. v.
Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925). The problem of allowing such suits has
been the occasion for considerable excursion into theories of corporate existence. See the
Petrogradsky case supra; Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign Assets of Nationalized
Russian Corporations (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1130, 1147; Comment (1931) 15 MINN. L.
R1v. 210.
15. Matter of People (Russian Reins. Co.), 255 N. Y. 415, 175 N. E. 114 (1931).
16. Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242 N. Y. 148, 151 N. E. 159 (1926);
N. Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 977-b.
17. See James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 257, 146 N. E. 369,
371 (1925).
18. Cf. People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 18 N. E. 692 (1888).
19. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 612; see Habicht, The Application of
Soviet Laws and the Exception of Public Order (1927) 21 Am. J. INT. L. 238; Loren-
zen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736;
Comments (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1463, 1467, et seq., (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 508.
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extraterritorial effect;20 the New York courts have traditionally so acted*2 1
But the United States Supreme Court seems to have subscribed to another
view in United States v. Bclzont,2 2 which also arose under the Litvinoff
assignment. Mr. justice Sutherland upbraided the American courts for
flaunting "public policy" objections to the Soviet decrees, after the executive
department had concluded a friendly agreement with the Soviet Guvern-
ment.2 3 Judge Lehman, doubtless mindful of these strong remarks, men-
20. Borchard, Confiscations: Extraterritorial and Domestic (1937) 31 Anr. J. InT.
L. 675; Nebolsine, supra note 14. Cf. Lecouturier v. Rey, [1910] A. C. 262. P1aglin v.
Cusenier Co., 221 U. S. 580 (1911) (confiscation of rroperty of Carthusian mtnl:s by
France not accorded extraterritorial effect). But the validity of confiscation decrees has
been upheld in regard to property within the territorial jurisdiction of the Soviet Gov-
ernment at the time of decrees, even though later removed. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933) (before recognition); Luther v.
Sagor, [1921] 3 K. B. 532 (after recognition). Cf. The Navemar, 102 F. (2d) 444
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939). Also, in regard to contracts made within Soviet Russia. Dougherty
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934). Cf. Holzer v. Deutsche
Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. (2d) 798 (1938). Consult Comment
(1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rv. 262, 448.
21. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 14t X. E. 3',0 1925)
(before recognition) ; Vladikavkazsk-y Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 203 X. Y. 3t,9, 189
N. E. 456 (1934) (after recognition) ; see Hudson, Recognition of For~gz G,.u''rn nts
and Its Effect on Prvate Rights (1936) 1 Mo. L. REV. 312, 319. For statutory indicia
of the public policy of New York in the matter of confiscatory practices of foreign g.,v-
ernments, see N. Y. Civ. PR-ic AcT § 977-b; id. §§ 474. 978, as amended by c. 672 of
Laws of 1939; Suim. CT. Acr §269, as amended by c. 343 of Laws of 1939. Notes ap-
pended to the 1939 amendments, supra. explain their purpose thus: "to authorize the
deposit of moneys or property in the Surrogate's Court in cases where transmission or
payment to a beneficiary, legatee or other person resident in a foreign country might he
circumvented by confiscation in whole or in part." On this authority, the Surrogate's
Court recently denied a request of the German consuls for the distributive shares of
four German nationals of Jewish race. Matter of Weisberg, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 1, 1939,
p. 1, cols. 3-5.
22. 301 U. S. 324 (1937). For a later history of the funds in issue in the Bel:onl
case, follow Meyer v. Petrograd Metal Works, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 125 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
23. Justice Sutherland's opinion raises an important question as to the meaning of
recognition. The better view seems to be that it does not connote positive approval of acts
of the recognized government. Borchard, supra note 20; Jessup, The Litzinoff .lssqn-
vient and the Belont Case (1937) 31 Ams. J. INT. L. 481; J. F. Williams, Recognition
in International Law (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 776. It implies simply normalcy in rela-
tions. See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 140 (1933)
("the very purpose of the recognition by our Government is that our nationals may be
conclusively advised with what government they may safely carry on business transactions
and who its representatives are") ; Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2,5 X. Y.
71, 8-85, 193 N. E. 897, 901 (1934). Conflict of laws rules alone should control both
before and after recognition; recognition itself is wholly immaterial. Borchard, The
Unrecognized Government in Amwrican Courts (1932) 26 Amr. J. INT. L. 261. But where
recognition is accompanied by some overt expression of sympathy, it would seem that
a superior public policy has been determined by executive action, and state policies are
irrelevant. See (1935) 35 CoL L. Ruv. 292, 295. But see Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. United States, supra, at 143.
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tions "public policy" only to make specific rejection of the argument as a
basis for the instant decision.24 By thus camouflaging his fundamental ob-
jection, Judge Lehman may have hoped to conceal the divergence between
his opinion and the advocacy by the Belmont case of unprejudiced enforcement
of Soviet decrees as the solemn pronouncements of a lawful government.
That he was probably conscious of this deviation is displayed by his insistence
that the Belmont case decided only that the United States had a cause of
action against a mere custodian of funds deposited in New York by a Russian
company. Both majority and minority, he points out, issued an emphatic
caveat that the decision did not preclude directors and stockholders of the
Russian corporation from intervening in the action and entering their claims
to the fund; latitude was thus expressly reserved for a decision in the situa-
tion now presented in the Moscow case.
Before giving content to any covert "public policy" objection, the New
York court should have sifted the equities. If the court had recognized the
Soviet Government as successor to the Moscow's residual right to property
in New York by virtue of the confiscatory decree, the interests of American
creditors would be unaffected, since their claims were satisfied out of the
fund long before this action was instituted for the surplus. Losses would
be sustained only by foreign creditors and stockholders, who may be said
to have assumed that risk when they invested in a Russian corporation. Funds
which are available only because of the single purpose of the New York
legislature to provide security for the domestic creditors of a foreign com-
pany would come to them wholly gratuitously. It is therefore neither shocking
nor fantastic that the United States should recover at their expense 2a and
for the ultimate benefit of Americans who had invested in property in' Soviet
Russia.
One conclusion is inescapable. Although the majority opinion in the
Moscow case is restrained and maintains at least superficial peace with the
strong remarks in the Belmont case, it confirms a lack of enthusiasm for
both the Soviet decrees and the Litvinoff assignment on the part of the
New York courts, which handle most of the litigation in this field. If the
Supreme Court should vote to affirm the decision in the Moscow case, 20 such
a triumph would undoubtedly encourage American courts to parade "public
policy" objections in defense of foreign victims of "un-American" confisca-
tions abroad. Many dispossessed Austrian and Czechoslovakian nationals are
now suing in New York courts to recover for goods sold and delivered before
their businesses were appropriated by agents of the German Reich.2 7 In
24. 280 N. Y. 286, 314, 20 N. E. (2d) 758, 769 (1939).
25. The question is frequently raised whether the United States violated the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution (i.e., prohibition against taking of private property
without just compensation) in accepting the Litvinoff assignment and thus joining in
the confiscation of property located within this country. See Borchard, supra note 20;
Jessup, supra note 23; Comment (1938) 5 U. oF Cri. L. Rzv. 280, 294-295; (1937)
47 YALE L. J. 292.
26. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. (1939) 7 U. S. L. WEIC 421.
27. Stern v. S. S. Steiner, Inc., 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 44 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Johnson v.
Briggs, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 60 (Munic. Ct. 1939). Of current interest are effects of
[Vol, 49
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these cases there will be much reliance on the precedents afforded by the long
history of Soviet litigation. If the past is any index to the future, prediction
may be made with some confidence that the recognition of the Anschluss,
and the non-recognition of the seizures of Czechoslovalda and Poland, wvill
prove immaterial.
JUDICIAL INTERCESSION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR*
COURTS have consistently manifested an understandable reluctance to inter-
cede in the internal affairs of non-profit associations.1 The desire to remain
aloof is most pronounced in the case of Educational,2 religiousa or secret4
societies, where a court which ventures to intervene finds itself faced with
finely shaded distinctions in pedagogics, theology or mumbo-jumbo. Yet this
desire is almost as strong with respect to all other non-profit organizations.
It is based on the often inarticulate attitude that such groups by their very
nature are better able than courts to solve typical controversies arising within
them. Only when "fundamental" rights5 are clearly violated or endangered
will a court intercede. A surprising variant from previously settled concep-
tions was presented by a recent judicial readjustment of one of the oldest
jurisdictional disputes within the American Federation of Labor.0
Mexican confiscatory decrees. Cf. Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum
Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
*Joseph Obergfell et aL. v. William Green ct a., 5 Lwu. RM.. W-P. 163 (D. D. C.
Oct. 6, 1939).
1. North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 23 F.
Supp. 694 (E. D. Ill. 1938); Harris v. Missouri P. Ry., 1 F. Supp. 946 (E. D. Ill. 1931);
Long v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 155 Md. 265, 141 Ati. 504 (1928); Franklin v. Penn-
Reading Seashore Lines, 122 N. J. Eq. 205, 193 Ad. 712 (Ch. 1937).
2. Anthony v. Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N. Y. Supp. 435 (4th
Dep't 1928); Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 1 Pa. D. & C. 3,3 (C. P. 1921), aff'd, 278
Pa. 121, 122 At. 220 (1923).
3. Bonacum v. Harrington, 65 Neb. 831, 91 N. W. 8S5 (102) ; Furmanski v. Iwan-
owsld, 265 Pa. 1, 108 Att. 27 (1919); see Watson v. Jones. 13 Wall. 679, 733 (U. S.
1871). Contra: Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun [1904] A. C. 515.
4. \Vellenvoss v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias of Kentucky, 103 Ky. 415, 45
S. W. 360 (1898).
5. See note 15 infra.
6. Obergfell v. Green, 5 LA. Rnr. R P. 163 (D. D. C. Oct. 6, 1939); see (1939)
5 LAB. Ru. RF'. 117; N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1939, p. 10, col. 3. For a history uf the dis-
pute, see BRooss, WHEN LABOR ORGANIZES (1st ed. 1937) 43; and ScmX mFR, Tina
BREWING INDUSTRY AND THE BREWERY WORMRS' M oVEMEM =~ AEr-scA (Ist ed.
1910) 226. Courts have previously declined to interfere with the AFL methud of maling
or enforcing jurisdictional awvards. California State Brewers' Institute v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers, 19 F. Supp. 824 (N. D.
Cal. 1937); Obergfell v. Green, 1 A L.uB. Rr\E. Rr.P. 663 (D. D. C. Dec. 23, 1937). But
see Green v. Gravatt, 19 F. Supp. 87 (W. D. Pa. 1Q37) (judicial interpretation of AFL
constitution, but not a jurisdictional dispute).
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Upon affiliation with the AFL in 1887, the Brewery Union was guaranteed
the protection of its right to retain in membership all workmen engaged in
the brewing industry, including those engaged in the transportation of brewery
products. A demand by the Teamsters Union for jurisdiction over brewery
drivers followed immediately upon that union's affiliation in 1899 and led to
insertion in the AFL constitution of an article designed to prevent such dis-
putes in the future. Concurrently the AFL reaffirmed the Brewery Union's
control over drivers in the industry. The guarantee proved short-lived; the
AFL convention in 1906 authorized the Executive Council to order transfer
of beer drivers to the Teamsters. Upon its failure to surrender jurisdiction,
the Brewery Union was suspended from the Federation. Restoration of the
charter followed at the next annual convention, but, punctuated by years of
armistice, the controversy continued, despite unceasing AFL efforts at settle-
ment.7 Finally the 1933 convention adopted a resolution deciding that brewery
drivers properly belonged to the Teamsters. The AFL endeavored to carry
out the resolution by instructing state federations of labor and central labor
bodies to expel recalcitrant local brewery unions. President Green also advised
employers of beer drivers henceforth to bargain collectively only with the
Teamsters. Methods considerably more violent were undertaken by the latter
union in attempting to give the resolution effect. 8
Threatened with loss of membership and bargaining power, the Brewery
Union sought refuge in a court of equity, asking that the AFL and the
Teamsters be enjoined from attempting to effect a transfer of jurisdiction over
beer drivers. The court proceeded upon the orthodox premise that the con-
stitution and by-laws of the AFL, coupled with the Brewery Union's cer-
tificate of affiliation, formed a contract between ihe two.0 Since its original
charter expressly conferred upon the Brewery Union exclusive jurisdiction
over beer drivers, 10 the court asserted that the AFL had never had power
to shift the affiliation of these members without the Union's consent. The
1933 resolution was therefore declared null and void, and the injunction
granted to prevent what "would amount to a judicial recognition of authority
acquired by usurpation.""
7. In 1915 a "working agreement" was concluded between the two disputants, affirm-
ing jurisdiction of the Brewery Union over beer drivers. The court's opinion expressly
makes this agreement irrelevant to the decision.
8. Brass knuckles, lead pipes and bombs were among the instrumentalities used by
members of Teamsters locals. Victims were loyal beer drivers, their employers and tav-
erns dealing with such employers. Obergfell v. William Green, 5 LAI. REL. REP. 163 (D.
D. C., Oct. 6, 1939), Amended and Additional Findings of Fact 45-48.
9. Grand Internat. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Couch, 236 Ala. 611,
184 So. 173 (1938) ; Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. 729,. 159 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup. Ct.
1916) ; Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union No. 2623 v. Internat. Woodworkers of Amer-
ica, Local No. 49, 197 Wash. 491, 85 P. (2d) 1099 (1938).
10. As between AFL affiliates. Obviously no guarantee was made or is here en-
forced against a bid for the beer drivers by a CIO or independent union.
11. The court was untroubled by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29
U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1934), since "the present suit sounds in contract." The Act's
literal terms would seem applicable, but judicial evasion thereof may sometimes be jus-




It is suggested, however, that the court's disregard of possible implied terms
of the contract has led to an over-simplified interpretation of its effect. The
AFL constitution provides for organization of labor by crafts, not by in-
dustries. 12 When the Brewery Union's charter is read in the light of this
provision, it would appear that the constitution has limited or modified the
effect of a certificate of affiliation purporting to guarantee an industrial union s
contemporaneous jurisdiction. While it is true that the AFL constitution
contains no e-x-press provision for the adjudication of jurisdictional disputes,
the constitutional amendment of 1900 clothes the AFL convention with power
to ascertain whether a jurisdictional -trespass" upon affiliated unions is
threatened.' 3 It would appear therefore that this amendment impliedly em-
powered the annual conventions to decide jurisdictional disputes, since with-
out this power the authorization to determine the existence of such disputes
would be meaningless. Moreover, by its repeated appeals to Federation con-
ventions and its willingness to rely upon favorable rulings thereof, the Brewery
Union itself seems to have considered that the AFL had power to adjust these
jurisdictional controversies. 14
Even when there has been a breach of contract, equity has traditionally
refused to interfere with an association's internal affairs when it has discovered
no threat to property or civil rights.15 The requirement has been seriously
criticized,' 0 yet, whatever the appropriate nomenclature, it remains true that
some substantial interest should be directly endangered. The court was con-
sequently careful to find an invasion of property interests, "probably the
most valuable that unionized workers can have," and scrupulous to enumer-
ate them: sick, death and strike benefits, and the benefit of collective bar-
gaining. Though the materialistic jurisprudence of another day often found
12. Art. II, § 2 of the constitution provides for "the establishment of National and
International Trade Unions, based upon a strict autonomy of each Trade, and the promo-
tion and advancement of such bodies."
13. Art. IX, § 11: "No charter shall be granted . .. if the jurisdiction claimed is a
trespass on the jurisdiction of existing affiliated unions . . .; no affiliated union shall
. . . change its . . . name, if any trespass is made thereby on the jurisdiction of an
affiliated organization, without having first obtained the consent . . . of a Convention."
The convention must decide that a trespass is threatened before it can give or withhold
its consent to a change in name.
14. Whatever the original terms of the contract, it could be held that rescission v-as
effected by the Brewery Union's suspension in 1907. It has been held that contracts
without time limit are terminable on reasonable notice by either of the parties. Restora-
tion of the union's charter while the jurisdictional controversy continued would seem to
indicate that any previous agreement purporting to settle that controversy must now he
considered at an end.
15. State ex rel. Rhodes Mortician & Undertaking Co. v. New Orleans Funeral Di-
rectors' Ass'n, 161 La. Si, 103 So. 132 (1926); Franklin v. Penn-Reading Seashore
Lines, 122 N. J. Eq. 205, 193 AUt. 712 (Ch. 1937); Carey v. International Brotherhood
of Paper 'Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N. Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
16. See Chaffee, The Internal Affairs of Associations not for Profit (1930) 43
HI-Iv. L. REv. 993, 1000. "The courts are so much occupied in declaring their unwilling-
ness to protect anything except property, that they do not take the time to ascertain that
an interest of substance is actually present in the particular case before them:'
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such rights too intangible for protection,'7 it is consistent with more mature
concepts and with the trend of recent decisions to affirm such benefits as
property.:' Indeed, interests much more nebulous have been so categorized
in order that a court might justify its invasion of an unincorporated associa-
tion.1 9
Yet no interests which demand judicial protection appear to be inherently
involved in the present case. It would seem that the court has failed to dis-
tinguish the substantial rights which are coincidentally present from the
interests actually affirmed by its injunction. Those benefits which the court
enumerates, its decision does not necessarily protect. Not the vested interests
of workers, but the Brewery Union's right to jurisdiction, is the subject of
the contract enforced by the court. A labor organization is thus given a
property right in its members. Divorced from the fortuitous equities in the
present situation, this would appear an extremely dangerous principle, increas-
ing the possibility of the very autocracy and usurpation which the court so
vehemently condemns.
In the present case it appears that the beer drivers actually would suffer
an impairment of position by a transfer of allegiance. 20 It can therefore be
argued that the contract was made for the benefit of the drivers and that their
vested rights are invaded by its breach. These equities, and the logical argu-
ment that they support, obfuscate the suggested defects in the court's reason-
ing. These defects would become apparent, if the Teamsters were to secure
more effective results from collective bargaining for their drivers than could
the Brewery Union. Beer drivers would then want to change their allegiance;
the Brewery Union would want to prevent such transfer. In that case"' the
court's ruling that the AFL had no power to alter this jurisdiction without
the Brewery Union's consent would fail to protect property and would in-
fringe upon the right of free association of which the court is so solicitous.
Another traditional doctrine forbids a court's intervention on behalf of one
who has failed to exhaust his remedies within the organization. 22 It would
seem that this requirement in the instant case was met. The Brewery Union
appealed to three successive AFL conventions after the 1933 resolution before
17. Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880).
18. Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine Operators of Essex County, N. J., Local
No. 244, 1 A. (2d) 850 (N. J. Ch. 1938).
19. Williams v. District Executive Board, U. M. W. of A., 1 Pa. D. & C. 31,
(C. P. 1921) (protects mere possibility of election to office).
20. A referendum in 1934 showed 99.7% of the Brewery Union members against the
proposed transfer. This would include almost all beer drivers in the union, indicating
advantages to them of remaining where they were.
21. The hypothesis in the present situation is perhaps unrealistic. The superior bar-
gaining position of an industrial union has been frequently emphasized. See Bnooics, op.
cit. supra note 6, passim. The eventuality here suggested would be more likely to mate-
rialize, were both disputants craft unions.
22. Harris v. Missouri P. Ry., 1 F. Supp. 946 (E. D. Ill. 1931); Internat. Hod
Carriers' Building & Common Laborers' Union of America, Local No. 426, v. Internat,
Hod Carriers' Building & Common Laborers' Union of America, Local No. 502, 101
N. J. Eq. 474, 138 AtI. 532 (1927) ; Rubens v. Weber, 237 App. Div. 15, 260 N. Y. Supp.
701 (1st Dep't 1932).
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seeking the injunction. It is settled that when further efforts within the asso-
ciation would be patently fruitless, even though logically possible, a court may
intercede.2 Moreover, a corollary to the general rule provides that when the
association's action is wholly unconstitutional or arbitrary, further appeal
within its framework is not necessary, and immediate resort to equity may
be had.24 This exception to the usual doctrine would apply to the present
situation, if the court's finding that the AFL was never made arbiter of the
brewery workers' destiny be accepted. Any doubt of the court's position as
to the arbitrary nature of AFL conduct is dispelled by its forcefully stated
proposition: "Whatever may be the factual situation at any time or place,
wherever usurped authority comes in contact with jurisprudence of a democ-
racy, it, then and there, instantly ceases to exist."
Even if it could be justified on doctrinal grounds, however, the injunction
may be seriously criticized. Rules governing judicial interference with an
association's internal affairs have largely evolved from litigation between an
individual member and his organization. Such cases are not helpful analogies.
No more helpful are the precedents of an injunction preventing an interna-
tional union from ordering the abolition and merger of a 'district' which had
accumulated large assets during many years of autonomous existence,2 or
an order that the American Legion reinstate a post expelled for violating the
Legion's rule that no local could publicly disagree with the national conven-
tion 26 Private property was directly threatened in the one case, and the
important civil right of free speech in the other. Neither personal liberties-
nor rights of property, but quasi-political interests are involved in the present
case. A court should be as hesitant to evaluate and determine these interests
as it is to intercede in other political controversies.2 s Objections similar to
those against judicial interference with religious and educational organizations
would seem likewise to be applicable.2 9
The relation between the Federation and its affiliates is not to be deter-
mined on principles of rigid contract law. Such a basis of adjudication is
oblivious to the inevitable phenomenon of organic evolution and growth.
Despite lacunae in the formal writings of association, the AFL has repeatedly
been entrusted with the settlement of jurisdictional controversies.30 The need
23. Local Lodge No. 104 of Internat. Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship
Builders, and Helpers of America v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron
Ship Builders, and Helpers of America, 158 W\rash. 480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930).
24. Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N. M. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1918).
25. Howard v. Weissmann, 31 F. (2d) 6S9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
26. Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 277 N. Y. Supp. 81 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
27. "Civil rights" include not only Constitutional guarantees, but conventional stan-
dards of natural justice, analogous to "due process." See Chaffee, supra note 16, at 1014.
28. Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50 (U. S. 1867); see WILLoucnB, PRucI.IPLES OF
THE Co1sTITUTI0oNAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1930) § -S9.
29. See notes 2 and 3 supra. "The health of society will usually be promoted if the
groups 'within it which serve the industrial, mental and spiritual needs of citizens are
genuinely alive . . . Legal supervision must often be withheld for fear that it may do
more harm than good!' Chaffee, supra note 16, at 1027.
30. "Between 1917 and 1924 the Executive Council handled about 150 jurisdictional
cases, of which about 50 were new disputes arising during these years." Lovx,,:, Tun
AmsmcANc FEz.RAno-N OF LAnoR (Brooldngs Institute 1933) 340, n. 3.
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of such a jurisdictional arbiter is a primary reason for the very existence
of the AFL.31 To hold a resolution of an AFL convention void and illegal is
to provoke resentment and to invite failure. 32 The AFL is an autonomous
voluntary confederation; its utility would appear to depend upon remaining
autonomous, free from judicial intrusion.
No completely effective device33 has been discovered for preventing or
regulating disputes over jurisdiction -the most inefficient and purposeless
of all labor controversies. 34 Sanctions are available, however, to minimize
concomitant injuries to innocent parties. Workers threatened with loss of
their jobs or of those benefits which the court enumerates in its opinion
appear to be within the aegis of equitable cognizance.aa Employers whose
business is endangered as the result of violence or coercion by the Teamsters
are free to seek judicial relief.3 6 It is further suggested that sanctions of the
public law are available to deter criminal behaviour of the Teamsters.a7 The
present case, however, seems to offer no appropriate solution to the juris-
dictional dispute problem. Rather, the court's natural anxiety to condemn
apparent usurpation has led to a highly questionable decision. judicial super-
sedure of a voluntary confederation's democratic action in order to protect
a doubtful fifty-year-old 'contract' and to affirm a union's vested right to
its members would seem to establish an unwise precedent.
31. "Unions are held together in the Federation by . . . the need for adjudicating
jurisdictional disputes." Id. at 324.
32. The 1939 AFL convention excoriated the Brewery Union for not settling the
dispute "within the family of labor." A Teamsters official there said: "I don't like the
style of the brewery workers taking us into the courts. I don't like a scab or a squealer
I'm going to go along regardless of your court or your injunction and I'm going
to get the brewery workers." N. Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1939, p. 17, cols. 2, 3.
33. Either within or without "the family of labor." The N. L. R. B. early decided
not to intervene in such controversies. See In the Matter of Aluminum Company of
America, 1 NLRB 530, April 10, 1936, holding that "self-organization of employees im-
plies a policy of self-management." This policy has been given judicial approval. Cali-
fornia Brewers Institute v. Internat'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stable-
men and Helpers, 19 F. Supp. 824 (N. D. Cal. 1937). For difficulties encountered in
AFL-CIO jurisdictional disputes, see (1939) 48 YA\LE L. J. 1053.
34. "The Federation deplores these disputes and is eager to eliminate them because
they are costly, because jurisdictional strikes antagonize employees and consume much
time, and because they create bitterness in the ranks of organized labor." Lorwin, op.
cit. supra note 31, 342.
35. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine
Operators of Essex County, N. J., Local No. 244, 1 A. (2d) 850 (N. J. Ch. 1938).
36. United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 93 P. (2d) 772 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1939); In-
ternational Union of United Brewing Workers v. California Brewers Institute, 25 F.
Supp. 870 (S. D. Cal. 1938) ; California Brewers Institute v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers, 1 A LAB. REL. REm', MANr. 661
(W. D. Wash. Oct. 22, 1937).
37. For a public sanction other than state criminal statutes, see N. Y. Times, Oct.
13, 1939, p. 1, cols 2-3 (indictment of Teamsters under Sherman Act).
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FOREIGN DIVORCE AS AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY*
WiEN a court is called upon to apply the law of another jurisdiction in a
situation in which the law itself is not well settled, a mechanical application
of general principles of the conflict of laws may lead to results unsatisfactory
to both jurisdictions. The recent case of Nc.w England Mutual Life Insurance
Company v. Spence' graphically illustrates this danger. In that case a federal
district court sitting in New York granted comity to a local insurance rule
of Texas so as to defeat the vested rights of a beneficiary under a Massachu-
setts life insurance policy. The policy was issued to Slade, the decedent,
while he resided in New York, and was made payable to his wife without
power reserved to change the beneficiary. Subsequently the couple became
domiciled in Texas, and there were divorced; the decree made a property
settlement, but failed to mention the life insurance policy. Both parties then
remarried, and the wife returned to New York, where on the death of the
insured she filed her claim under the policy. Since the decedent's adminis-
trator also claimed the proceeds of the policy, the insurance company, to
determine the person to whom it was liable, interpleaded in the Federal
District Court for the Western District of New York, naming as defendants
both adverse claimants. The court awarded the proceeds of the policy to
the wife, 2 but the circuit court on appeal reversed this judgment.3 The rights
of the wife, which were vested under the express terms of the policy, could
be defeated only by a later valid transfer.4 There was no voluntary assign-
ment; but the court, granting comity to the unique Texas insurance doctrineO
which requires that a beneficiary, in order to collect the proceeds of a policy,
have a continuing insurable interest,0 ruled that the divorce, in terminating
the wife's insurable interest, automatically transferred to the insured's estate
her rights under the policy.
To speak of granting "comity" to Texas internal rules of law has a con-
vincing ring of courtesy and co-operation, and adherence to orthodox prin-
* New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F. (2d) 6t5 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
1. 104 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
2. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 25 F. Supp. 633 (NN. D. N. Y. 193S).
3. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
4. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 79 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935); Witherington v. Nicl:erson, 25
Mass. 351, 152 N. E. 707 (1926); Ruckenstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 263 X. Y.
204, 188 N. E. 650 (1934); McNeil v. Chinn, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 551, 101 S. W. 465
(1907) ; 24 TFx. Jtn 762 (1935).
5. The Texas insurable interest rule is contrary to the corresponding rule of every
other American jurisdiction. 52 A. L. R. 386, 397-399 (1928) ; VANCE. INsURAN;CE (24
ed. 1930) § 155, n. 14. Early Texas cases relied heavily on the dictum in Warnozlz v.
Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 779 (1881), which seemed to indicate the necessity for a continu-
ing insurable interest. This dictum was, however, specifically overruled in Grigsby v.
Russell, 222 U. S. 149 (1911).
6. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Hazlewood, 75 Tex. 338, 12 S. W. 621 (1839) ; Cheeves
v. Anders, 87 Ten. 287, 28 S. W. 274 (1894); Hatch v. Hatch, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 373,
80 S. ANT. 411 (1904).
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ciples.7 The difficulty in this case is that the basis for co-operation is lacking.
There is no Texas law in point; all the cases relied on by the majority
involved contracts made in Texas by Texas citizens.8 It is therefore by no
means as certain as the circuit court assumed that the Texas courts, even in
a suit directly on the policy, would apply their rule and destroy vested rights
under a foreign contract. It is even more doubtful whether the divorce action,
which made no ruling as to the policy, can validly be said to effect an auto-
matic transfer.9 In this action there is added to the uncertainty as to the
Texas law with regard to foreign contracts, the turther question of the juris-
diction of the divorce court to adjudicate rights to the policy.
It might be said that by submitting to the divorce court the determination
of their rights, the parties consented to any consequences which flow, under
the law of the forum, from that determination."0 This statement is misleading
in its simplicity. The divorce decree certainly has the effect of destroying
the wife's insurable interest; and at least in the case of a Texas contract,
this may have the further effect of preventing recovery on the policy in the
Texas courts. But it does not follow that the divorce decree itself results in
an automatic transfer of the policy. It cannot well be argued that the parties
consent in every action to all the law of the forum whether relevant or not
to the particular suit. Their consent is limited to the adjudication of the
rights they are litigating -here those of marital status. Unless, therefore,
there is a relationship between the policy and the rights in dispute, it is very
7. It has been argued that the court's reasoning was circular, that it found an invol-
untary transfer had occurred in Texas by applying Texas internal law, and then felt
obliged to follow Texas internal law because a transfer is governed by laws of the place
of assignment. (1939) 39 COL L. REv. 1224, 1225. The argument, however, is not con-
vincing. The fault in the court's analysis seems to be not circularity of reasoning, but a
misconception of the applicable Texas law.
8. Price v. Supreme Lodge, 68 Tex. 361, 4 S. W. 633 (1887); Schonfield v. Turner,
75 Tex. 324, 12 S. W. 626 (1889) ; Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S. W. 274 (1894) ;
Hatch v. Hatch, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 373, 80 S. W. 411 (1904). The rather meager case
law on this point in other jurisdictions also seems opposed to the decision of the majority
in the instant case. See Pendleton v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 135 Okla. 40, 43, 273
Pac. 1007, 1009 (1929) ; ci. McGrew v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 132 Cal. 85, 64 Pac, 103
(1901), aff'd, 188 U. S. 291 (1902). The Pendleton case held the law of place of con-
tracting governs in determining whether the right of a beneficiary, the wife of the as-
sured, is lost by divorce. See 2 BEALE, COFLICr OF DAWS (1935) 1212. In Kentucky a
statute provides that divorce shall prevent the recovery by the beneficiary on any insur-
ance on the life of the former spouse. Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) §§ 654, 655. See
Bradley v. Bradley, 178 Ky. 239, 198 S.W. 905 (1917); VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed.
1930) § 155 n. 17. Other states have statutes which confer the power upon the insured
to substitute another beneficiary in place of the one divorced. MINN. STAT. (Mason,
1927) § 3388; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 5739; N. Y. CIVIL P.ACTimC Acr § 1160.
9. The majority's use of the concept of an automatic transfer has been criticized as
"fictional" on the ground that the effect of divorce in the instant case has no real analogy
to an actual assignment. (1939) 39 COL. L. REV. 1224, 1225. It is not, however, the fact
that the concept is "fictional" but the fact that the "fiction" is inapt in the circumstances
of the instant case that makes the court's use of the term unfortunate. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F. (2d) 665, 668 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
10. Clark v. Willard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934); (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 835.
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doubtful whether the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights under
the policy, and almost certain that the decree of the divorce court cannot itself
operate to effect a transfer of these rights.
The reason many of the Texas cases give a divorce decree the effect of an
automatic transfer is that in Texas insurance contracts may be community
property.' A divorce decree, in shattering the marital bond, dissolves also
this joint ownership of the policy by the ex-spouses. Therefore, the divorce
court has as a necessary auxiliary to its primary jurisdiction over the parties'
status, the power to dispose of the policy. 3 Thus where the policy is com-
munity property, the divorce decree may validly be said to effect an automatic
transfer.14 Where, however, the policy is not community property, 3 the
Texas court has itself held, in a case strongly emphasized by the majority
in the instant case'" and involving a Texas contract, that a divorce, though
ending the wife's insurable interest, is not res judicata as to the rights in
the policy, and does not operate to transfer it.17
11. Life insurance proceeds will become community or separate property according
to the intention of the parties as shown by the insurance contract, and .,ill not h de-
pendent upon the character of the fund from which payment of premiums is made. Mar-
tin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.AV. 624 (1901); Jones v. Jones, 146 S..W. 265
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912). See McKAY-, CoMMuNITY PnoPRTY (2d ed. 1925) §9 1-4.
12. Givens v. Givens, 195 S. NV. 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) ; SrFaen, N.,Arrx P1GUTS
IN TEXAs (1929) § 395. When community property is not divided by the divorce court,
the former spouses hold such property as tenants in common. McKAY, CommumIrv"
PRoPmTrY (2d ed. 1925) § 134.
13. A court's power to make a property settlement on divorce, like its power to
grant a divorce, is statutory. McKx1Y, Co1ntu.xrTY PRoPrMrv (2d ed. 1925) § 1333.
There is a Texas statute, which gives the divorce court wide discretion to make an
equitable division of the spouses' property. TFx. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 4633. This
statute has been held to be mandatory. Ex Pare Scott, 123 S. IV. (2d) 305 (Tex. Sup.
Ct 1939). There was, however, no need for the court in the principal case to afford this
statute full faith and credit, since its primary function is to divide community property.
Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443 (1855) ; Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Te. 404, 248 S. NV. 21 (1923);
15 TFax. Jum. 582 (1935).
14. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Whiteselle, 183 S. V. _2 (Te. Civ. App.
1916), aff'd, 221 S. W. 575 (Tex. Com. App. 1920).
15. In the principal case property rights were vested in the wife and were, therefore,
clearly the property, not of the community estate, but of one spouse only. The Te.as
Constitution holds that if property is acquired by gift or devise during marriage, it is
separate property. Tax. CoxsT. Art. XVI, § 15. The purchase of a life insurance policy
by the husband with the proceeds payable to the wife only is most convincing evidence
of a gift and of the husband's intention to make proceeds wife's separate property. Evans
v. Opperman, 76 Tex. 293, 13 S. WV. 312 (1890); SPaER, MAmUTAL Rxonrs m Taxs
(1929) § 421.
16. New England Mlut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F. (2d) 665, 6C5 (C. C. A. 2d,
1939).
17. Hatch v. Hatch, 35 Tex. 373, 80 S. W. 411 (1903). See Whetstone v. Coffey,
48 Tex. 269 (1877), (although divorce court has power to make community property
settlement, held, if this not done, divorced woman not precluded from afterwards bringing
a suit to recover her interest in the property) ; Garnett v. Garnett, 114 Mass. 347 (1874),
(in absence of statutory authority divorce court has no power to deal vith separate
property of spouses).
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A fortiori, in a non-Texas policy, the divorce decree cannot be validly said
to bar per se the rights of the wife-beneficiary. It is far from certain, more-
over, that the Texas courts would not enforce the vested rights of the wife-
beneficiary in a separate suit on the policy. Since the divorce decree does
not effect a transfer in Texas, the law of the place where the contract was
made remains, by general conflicts principles, controlling."8 It seems, there-
fore, extremely likely that the Texas courts would grant comity to the New
York insurance rule. 19
It is possible, however, that the Texas courts, relying on a line of cases
which attach special consequences to domicil,2 0 might subordinate the concept
of comity to the dominant public policy of the forum. There are, however,
no Texas cases which indicate that the courts regard the public policy behind
their insurable interest doctrine as dominant enough to justify its extension
18. Russo v. Slawsby, 276 Mass. 126, 176 N. E. 794 (1931) ; Quast v. Fidelity Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 226 N. Y. 270, 123 N. E. 494 (1919) ; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) § 332. When, however, a contract is transferred, it is governed by the law of the
place of assignment. Wilde v. Wilde, 209 Mass. 205, 95 N. E. 295 (1911) ; Jackson v.
Tallmadge, 246 N. Y. 133, 158 N. E. 48 (1927) ; RESTATE-MENT, CONFLICT or LAWS (1934)
§§ 348, 350.
19. Ryan v. Missouri, K., T. R. R., 65 Tex. 13 (1885) ; Seiders v. Merchants' Life
Ass'n, 93 Tex. 194, 54 S.W. 753 (1900) ; Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 94
Tex. 25, 57 S. W. 635 (1900). These cases have been relied on to show that Texas re-
gards the law of the place of contracting as controlling. 2 BEALE, CONFLICTS Or LAWS
(1935) 1166. Texas writers, however, state that the primary factor determining in
Texas courts what law governs is the intention of the parties. Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws-Validity of Contracts-Texas Cases (1932) 10 TEX. L. REy. 163; (1929) 7 TEX.
L. REv. 627. In the principal case, since the intention of the parties is not stated clearly,
it is presumed that they intended to be governed by the law of the place of contracting.
9 TEX. Jui. 359.
20. Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, 245 U. S. 412 (1918); Walker v. Goetz, 218
S. W. 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Taylor v. Leonard, 275 S. W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App,
1925). In all these cases special consequences were attached to domicil. For example, in
the Grossman case a married woman, domiciled in Texas, by whose laws she was in-
capable of making a valid contract of suretyship, made such a contract in Illinois where
a married woman has such capacity. In a suit on this contract in Texas, the court at-
tached special significance to the public policy of the married woman's domicil and con-
cluded that although she would have been unable to set up her coverture as a defense
to an action brought in Illinois or any other jurisdiction, she should not be held liable
on this contract. Accordingly, had the present case been brought in a Texas forum, the
court, by extending the Grossman rule might have decided that the law of the controlling
domicil determined whether the wife was disqualified by divorce from receiving the
benefits of her husband's life insurance policy. Such an extension would, however, have
been unwarranted. In the Grossman case, the wife's immunity during coverture not only
was based on Texas authority squarely in point, but was also an adjunct of marital status,
hence rightly connected with domicil. On the other hand, in the principal case, the dis-
qualification arose not from the law of divorce or of property transfer, but from general
insurance law-applicable to all insurance contracts alike. Therefore, since the wife's
disqualification is not related to marital status, there is no basis for applying the rule of
the Grossman case. See New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F. (2d) 665,
668 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
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to non-Texas contracts.2 1 And it seems unlikely that they would do so in
the light of recent decisions which tend to modify this doctrine even as to
Texas contracts.2 Moreover, the possibility that the Texas courts might
choose to extend the rule because of "dominant public policy" does not seem
to justify the federal court in New York in barring the wife's recover-.
Comity should be granted, not to inchoate and doubtful public policy, but only
to definite rules of decision.2 3 The court in the instant case was actually
speculating as to what the Texas courts would do in a situation with which
they had never been faced. This is a slender basis on which to defeat vested
contractual rights and give extraterritorial effect to a peculiar and antiquated
local insurance rule.2 4  It is ironical that the beneficiary should lose her
"vested" rights because a "liberal" forum felt called upon to apply the harsh
rule of another jurisdiction when, had the suit been brought in the "un-
favorable" jurisdiction, the beneficiary would probably have recovered.
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DISAGREEMENT OVER APPROPRIATE
EMPLOYEE BARGAINING UNIT*
RECENT opinions and dissents by Member Leiserson' of the National Labor
Relations Board have focused attention on a fundamental conflict of rationale
among the Board members as to the effect to be given to certain factors in
the determination of appropriate employee units fur collective bargaining.
The National Labor Relations Act 2 grants the Board power to determine
such units, and states that the choice is to be exercised among the "employer
21. See note 8 supra.
22. Shoemaker v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 48 S. W. (2d) 612 (TeE. Comm. App.
1932) (although divorced wife allowed to collect proceeds of the policy because it was
considered a matured debt, an assignment by the husband to the wife in geed faith was
considered valid. The case establishes the proposition that a divorced wife can own an
interest in an insurance policy on the life of her former husband if interest is limited in
such a way as not to give her a motive for murdering him) ; Russell v. Russell, 79 S. NV.
(2d) 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (dictum that policy could be awarded to husband and
wife could be compensated for her interest by awarding other property to her). See Huie,
Co2nnimity Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance (1939) 17 TnX. L Rnv. 121.
23. 3 BEA.LE, CoxFLircs oF LAws (1935) 1647-1051.
24. The breadth of future application of the rule of the principal case is limited by
the fact that similar situations will arise infrequently, since, before the doctrine of tis
case can be applied, the issues in litigation must have first been subjected to the juris-
diction of a foreign court by a primary transaction to which foreign law- attaches definite
secondary consequences. But cf. (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 1224, 1226, n. 13.
* In re American Can Co., 13 N. L. R. B. No. 126. July 29, 1939.
1. William M. Leiserson was Chairman of the National Mediation Board, which
administered the Railway Labor Act. He wvas appointed to the N. L. R. B. to take the
place of D. \V. Smith on April 25, 1939, (1939) 4 LAB. REL. REP. 301, and assumed his
duties as a member of the Board on June 1, 1939. Id. at 513.
2. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
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unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." It requires the Board
to choose that employee unit which will "insure to employees their full right
to self-organization and to collective bargaining," and which will otherwise
effectuate the statutory policies. 4
The Statute fails to specify any objective criteria by which the various
possible employee groupings in a given case might be evaluated in order to
insure to employees their full right to collective bargaining. But the Board
at an early stage found, by implication, indications of the appropriate employee
unit in the history of labor relations within the particular industry or between
the particular employer and his employees, in the skill required of various
employees and the wages paid to them, in the organization of the employer's
business, in the form of labor organization previously adopted by employees
and in the eligibility of employees for membership in labor organizations.5
In 1937, after the development of these criteria, a situation arose in the
Globe Machine and Stamping Company case," where the factors pointing to
one proposed employee grouping as appropriate were balanced by equally
important considerations favoring another, and separation of certain craft
groups from a larger body was equally as justifiable as their inclusion within
the larger body itself. To meet this new situation, the Board established what
is now known as the Globe doctrine of self-determination, ruling unanimously
that craft groups were entitled in such cases to determine for themselves, by
majority vote in separate elections, whether they wished to be included in the
larger body or to be segregated for the purpose of collective bargaining.7
3. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159b (Supp. 1938). "The Board shall decide in
each case whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-
organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this
act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer
unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof."
"Such a determination is required in two types of cases: (1) Petitions for investigation
and certification of representatives, pursuant to section 9 (c) of the act, and (2) com-
plaints charging that an employer has refused to bargain collectively with the representa-
tives of his employees, in violation of section 8, subdivision (5) of the act. In each
instance, a finding as to the appropriate unit is indispensable to the ultimate decision."
1 NLRB Ann. Rep. (1936) 112. See generally Cohen, The Appropriate Unit Under the
National Labor Relations Act (1939) 39 COL. L. Rsv. 1110.
4. See note 3 supra.
5. The various factors involved in determining the appropriate unit have been listed
and commented upon by the N. L. R. B. 1 NLRB Ann. Rep. (1936) 112; 2 ied. (1937)
122; 3 id. (1939) 156. For exhaustive treatment of the subject, see Cohen, loc. cit. supra
note 3; Stix, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit Under the Wagner Act (1938) 23 WASHl.
U. L. Q. 156; Rice, Determination of Employee Representatives (1938) 5 LAW & CON-
TmEP. PROD. 188, 200 et seq.; Comment (1938) 32 ILL. L. Rzv. 593; Comment (1937)
12 Wis. L. REv. 367.
6. In re Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 N. L. R. B. 294 (1937). A similar situa-
tion was before the Board on the same day, with the same result. In re City Auto Stamp-
ing Co., 3 N. L. R. B. 306 (1937).
7. For discussion of this and similar decisions and their ramifications, see 3 NLRB
Ann. Rep. (1939) 168; Cohen, supra note 3 at 1124; Rice, loc. cit. supra note 5; Com-
ment (1939) 6 U. oF Cli. L. REv. 673; (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 122.
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Shortly after promulgation of the Globe doctrine, its use in the Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Company case s gave rise to the first dissent in the
history of the Board. Chairman Madden and Member Donald Wakefield
Smith made a finding that the usual considerations were balanced, and there-
upon granted self-determination to craft groups; but Mlember Edwin S.
Smith favored Board-determination of the larger group as the appropriate
employee unit,9 implying that these considerations should be found to balance
only when the crafts involved have had a history of separate collective bar-
gaining with the employer. In subsequent cases, E. S. Smith reiterated his
dissent from the Madden and D. W. Smith interpretation of the Globe rule.P
With the replacement of D. W. Smith by William Al. Leiserson on June 1,
1939, E. S. Smith's dissenting -view assumed new importance; for, should
Leiserson accept it, it would replace the Madden interpretation of the Globe
doctrine as the Board policy.
The issues of the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company case were first
presented for Leiserson's determination'" on July 29 in the American Can
Company case."- Three craft unions had petitioned the Board for segregation
of their tventy employees from an existing industrial bargaining unit, com-
prising most of the 891 employees of the plant. The industrial unit objected,
contending that it was the appropriate group. The usual determinants merely
indicated that the Board would be justified in either segregating the crafts
or including them in the larger body. The crafts were unable to show a
history of collective bargaining with the employer; on the contrary, the
industrial union proved that the craftsmen had been included in a labor
contract which it had maintained with the company for two years. Madden
favored self-determination by the crafts, in accordance with the majority
reasoning in the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company case. E. S. Smith
S. In re Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 159 (1937) (decided November 20,
appro-imately four months after In rc Globe Machine & Stamping Co., supra note 6).
9. Member E. S. Smith's dissent manifested a fundamental departure from Chairman
Madden's and Member D. NV. Smith's belief that crafts should bargain separately if they
so desire; E. S. Smith started with the premise that the bargaining power of the great
number of unskilled workers should not be reduced by the separation of a few key craft
workers into separate bargaining units. In re Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N. L. RL B.
159, 175 (1937).
10. Smith testified on June 5, 1939, during hearings of the Senate Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor concerning proposed amendments to the N. L. L .4, that he still
believed in the reasoning of his dissent in the Allis-Chaibners case, and that over half of
his 25 dissents to date were in opposition to application of the Globe doctrine in cases of
the Allis-Chalmers type. Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor on S.
woo, S. r264, S. x392, S. 155o, S. 15So and S. 2.23, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 15S;
id. at 1569.
11. The issues of the Globe case arose twice between June 1st and July 29th, but in
each instance a decision by Leiserson upon the issues of either the Globe case or the Alli-
Chalmcrs case was avoided. In re Oppenheimer Casing Co., 13 N. L. IL B. No. 57,
July 7, 1939; In re Locke Insulator Corp., 13 N. L. P. B. No. 70, July 17, 1939.
12. In re American Can Co., 13 N. L. R. B. No. 126, July 29, 1939, smnmari-cd in
(1939) 4 LAE. REL. REP. 849.
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reiterated the reasoning of his dissenting view in that case, and favored a
Board decision that the crafts were to bargain as part of the larger group.
Leiserson, though rejecting the reasoning of both, reached Smith's result-
that segregation of crafts should be denied- by holding that the Board is
not empowered by the N.L.R.A. to disturb or allow alteration of a bargaining
unit established by the parties to a labor contract. The reasoning of the
Leiserson opinion was completely foreign to both Madden's and Smith's
conceptions of the Board's powers; Madden and Smith had always agreed
that the Board was empowered to weigh the unit delineated in a labor con-
tract as but one indicator of the proper employee group for collective bar-
gaining,13 and had disagreed only as to the proper Board action to be taken
in some of the cases in which the various indicia, of which this was one, had
balanced out.' 4 Leiserson, however, ruled that where there has been a previous
labor contract, the employee group there delineated is the only indicator which
the Board may consider, and the Board must select that particular employee
classification, regardless of other possible indicia.
Leiserson saw great advantages in a "rigid rule" which "binds the members
of the Board" ;15 he conceived that his doctrine, in cases where it is applicable,
would keep the Board from "taking sides in jurisdictional controversies among
labor organizations which differ as to the most effective form of organization
for collective bargaining purposes,"' 6 and reduce the Board's duties to those
of a mere fact-finding body, thus making it completely neutral.
But actually, a Board bound by the Leiserson rule would not be neutral;
it would strongly favor industrial unionism. In some cases this would act
as a permanent bar to the representation of craftsmen by craft unions, while
it would never in similar cases so bar representation by industrial unions.
For example, if the first labor contract were one obtained for a plant-wide
employee group by an industrial union, Leiserson's rule would deny to crafts
the privilege of a separate representation election; the effect of such denial
would be to deprive the crafts of representation by craft unions unless they
could obtain a consent to the segregation from a majority of the workers in
the industrial unit,' 7 which would be, of course, extremely unlikely. Yet if
the first labor contracts were obtained for crafts by craft unions, nothing
13. The previously established Board view is stated in its annual reports, "The form
which self-organization has taken among the employees involved in a proceeding, or
among workers similarly situated, is one of the most significant factors in determining
the appropriate unit. Self-organization which has resulted in successful collective bar-
gaining in the past can be relied on as a guide for future collective bargaining." 2 NLRB
Ann. Rep. (1937) 125; 3 id. (1939) 160.
14. See note 10 supra.
15. In re Milton Bradley Co., 15 N. L. R. B. No. 105, Oct. 6, 1939. (Leiserson's
prevailing opinion in a case comparable to In re American Can Company in both facts
and opinion).
16. Ibid.
17. If the industrial unit will consent to the proposed segregation of crafts, the
Board will usually determine such crafts separate appropriate units for collective bar-
gaining purposes. See Rice, supra note 5, at 201, and cases there cited.
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would prevent the crafts from voting, in their separate elections, to be repre-
sented by an industrial union. s
And even if the Leiserson doctrine were neutral, the benefits obtainable
from this rigid rule of law would not offset the harmful effects of its restric-
tion of Board discretion. The Board would be forced to approve the hap-
hazard employee groupings established at the inception of collective bargaining
within a company, without being able to consider either the natural, most
efficient classification of employees 19 or the classification generally used else-
where in the industry.20 And the Board would be forced to discontinue its
present desirable policy of approving unnatural employee groupings in order
to hasten collective bargaining,2 ' if it could no longer alter the groups so
established.
22
In cases where it is applicable, Leiserson's rule has made Smith's dissent
in the Allis-Chalners case the Board policy. When, as in the Alncrican Can
Company case, there has been a previous industrial-type labor contract and
the Globe rule is applicable, Leiserson favors an industrial employee group,
18. Crafts will be allowed to vote for representation by an industrial union even
though, at the time, the crafts have collective bargaining contracts with the employer.
Rice, supra note 5, at 194.
19. See In re Clyde 'Mallory Lines, 15 N. L. R. B. No. 111, Oct. 10, 1939 (em-
ployees engaged generally in maintenance and repair work had been arbitrarily split by
a collective bargaining contract into two groups as a result of fortuitous organizationa!
development of rival labor unions; Leisersun refused to agree to the merger of the to
groups into one bargaining unit).
20. In In re West Coast Wood Preserving Co., 15 N. L. R. B. No. 1, Sept. 1, 1939,
Leiserson's prevailing opinion denied self-determination to crafts because of their pre-
vious inclusion in an industrial labor contract, although these crafts bargain separately
elsewhere in the industry; see In re Globe Newspaper Co., 15 N. L. R B. No. 105, Oct.
7, 1939, in which Leiserson dissented from the majority's inclusion of craft employees
in a larger group where the craft employees had been excluded from a previous labor con-
tract, although the industry uniformly included the craft in the larger group for bargain-
ing purposes. However. in In re Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 14 X. L. R. B. No. 33, Aug.
18, 1939, Leiserson concurred to the inclusion of crafts in a case similar to In re Globe
Ne'wspaper Company. But cf. Brotherhood v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 94 F. (2d)
97 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937) (under Railway Labor Act, National Mediation Board's inclusion
of crafts in a larger unit in accord with practice elsewhere in industry held arbitrary
upon showing of previous separate bargaining by the crafts ).
21. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 15 N. L. R. B. No. 106, Oct. 7, 1939 (a craft, prop-
erly a separate appropriate unit, temporarily included by the Board in a larger unit,
pending organization of the craft); In re Great Lakes Steel Corp., 14 X. L R. B. No. 14,
Aug. 4, 1939 (organized employees operating railroad in one plant temporarily excluded
from a proper unit of employees operating railroads in all plants, pending organization of
employees operating railroads in other plants); In re Burroughs Adding Machine Co.,
14 N. L. R. B. No. 62, Aug. 19, 1939 (organized employees in one office of company
excluded from proper unit of employees in all offices, pending organization of em-
ployees in other offices); see In re Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 15 N. L. IL B. No. 6,
Sept. 22, 1939.
22. Leiserson's rule would not allow the groups so established to be altered, once such
groups had obtained collective bargaining contracts. See In re Bendi. Products Corp.,
15 N. L. R. B. No. 107, Oct. 7, 1939 (alteration denied, Leiserson concurring).
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and Madden favors self-determination. If Smith finds no history of separate
collective bargaining by the crafts, as in the Allis-Chalmers case, he can concur
with Leiserson; while if he finds that such a history exists, as in the Globe
Machine and Stamping Company case, he can concur with Madden. When,
on the other hand, there have been previous separate craft bargaining con-
tracts and the Globe rule is again applicable, Leiserson favors separation of
the crafts, Madden favors self-determination, and Smith finds in the contracts
enough history of separate bargaining by the crafts to justify his concurring
with Madden in granting self-determination. Since the Leiserson rule, when
applicable, makes Smith's dissent in the Allis-Chalmers case the rule of the
Board, it seems improbable that Smith would be willing to reconcile his
views with those of Madden, 23 or take other action to render the Leiserson
opinion nugatory.
Madden will probably continue to dissent vigorously but ineffectively to
the Smith and Leiserson views, when they combine to deny self-determination
in cases where it previously would have been granted,24 but it is unlikely
that he will attempt to restore the former Board rule by any means other
than by making further efforts to persuade the other Board members to
restore it.25
But the present Board policy may be changed by Leiserson's own alteration
of his rule. He may decide that the success which the National Mediation
Board experienced with his doctrine 26 in its administration of the Railway
Labor Act 2 7 was due, in part, to the peculiar position of dominance which
craft unions enjoy in the railroad field. Railroad labor had firmly established
crafts as the important bargaining units long before the Leiserson rule was
first applied, so that the possibility was remote that the rule, which operates
to prevent smaller units from obtaining separate representation, would ever
deprive a craft of the privilege of bargaining separately. Yet the doctrine
did provide a solution to one of the chief problems of the National Mediation
Board by curbing attempts of discontented minorities in well-defined crafts
to obtain separate representation. 28
23. A reconciliation of the Smith and Madden views is unquestionably desirable. See
Comment, N. L. R. B. Divided on Appropriate Bargaining Unit (1939) 8 INT. Jvum.
Ass'N Bumz 31. But it is unlikely that Smith will alter his present view to achieve
such a result.
24. For Madden's dissents in such cases, see In re West Coast Wood Preserving Co.,
15 N. L. R. B. No. 1, Sept. 1, 1939; In re Milton Bradley Co., 15 N. L. R. B. No. 105,
Oct. 6, 1939; In re Bendix Products Corp., 15 N. L. R. B. No. 107, Oct. 7, 1939; In re'
Roberts & Manders Stove Co., 16 N. L. R. B. No. 78, Oct. 31, 1939.
25. Madden could attempt to restore the former Board rule by several other means,
if he so chose; he could request a legislative guide for the Board, or he could concur
with Leiserson in a test case, seeking court determination that the Leiserson doctrine
is arbitrary.
26. Leiserson so states in his opinion in In re Milton Bradley Co., 15 N. L. R. B.
No. 105, Oct. 6, 1939.
27. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), amended 48 STAT. 926, 1185 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 151
et seq. (1934).
28. "On the basis . . . of experience .... the Board is impressed that the tendency
to divide and further subdivide established and recognized crafts and classes of employees
has already gone too far . . ." 1 NAT. MED. BOARD ANN. REP. (1935) 21.
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Recent decisions by Leiserson may indicate that he has already attempted
to offset the advantage which his rule gives to industrial unionism ;2 he has
held that the Board is not bound to accept a plant-wide bargaining unit
delineated in a previous labor contract, if the crafts seeking segregation can
show, by any construction of the facts 30 or of the contracts,3 ' that they had
not acquiesced to their inclusion in the larger unit. Other recent Leiserson
decisions have left the way open for him further to limit his rule in the
future. In situations of the Allis-Chalmers type where there are no previous
labor contracts involved, Leiserson, in disagreeing with Madden and Smith,
has favored Board-determination of the craft groups as proper, separate bar-
gaining groups ;32 if his dissent were adopted by the Board, he might fed
justified in ruling, at same later time, that crafts once separated by the Board
should always be granted separate representation elections in spite of inter-
vening industrial contracts. And his concurrance in the L. B. Loclwood
Company case 33 opens the door for another restriction of his rule; he may
now hold that if a craft had once obtained a separate collective bargaining
contract, or had merely been excluded from an industrial-type labor contract, 4
the Board may grant to the craft the privilege of self-determination, even
though the craft had meanwhile been included in a plant-wide labor contract.
29. As of Nov. 9, 1939.
30. See It re Chicago 'Malleable Castings Co., 16 N. L. R. B. No. 9, Oct. 16, 1939
(Leiserson's concurring opinion); In re Toledo Steel Tube Co., 15 N. L. R. B. No.
95, Oct. 3, 1939 (Leiserson's concurring opinion); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 15 N. L.
R. B. No. 106, at 10, Oct. 7, 1939 (Leiserson's dissenting opinion) ; In rc Sloss Sheffield
Steel and Iron Co., 14 N. L. R. B. No. 13, Aug. 4, 1939 (by implication).
31. See In re B. F. Goodrich Co., 16 N. L. R. B. No. 19, Oct. 19, 1939 (Leiserson's
concurring opinion).
32. For recent Leiserson opinions to this effect, see In re Toledo Steel Tube Co.,
15 N. L. R. B. No. 95, Oct. 3, 1939; In re Willys Overland Motors, Inc., 15 N. L. P. B.
No. 98, at 8, Oct. 4, 1939; In re Stokely Bros. & Co., 15 N. L. R. B. No. 99, Oct 4, 1939;
Is re Walgreen Co., 15 N. L. R. B. No. 109, Oct 9, 1939; In re Armour & Co., 16
N. L. R. B. No. 38, Oct 24, 1939.
33. It re L. B. Lockwood Co., 16 N. L. t. B. No. 11, Oct 17, 1939.
34. See In re L. B. Lockwood Co., 16 N. L. F. B. No. 11, OcL 17, 1939 (Leierson
concurring to a grant of self-determination to crafts once excluded from industrial labor
contract, later included) ; In re Globe Newspaper Co., 15 N. L. P B. No. 105, at 10, Oct. 7,
1939 (Leiserson dissenting to a denial of self-determination to crafts once excluded from
an industrial labor contract).
If Leiserson were willing to grant self-determination to crafts which had been merely
excluded from a previous labor contract, it should follow that he would grant self-deter-
mination to crafts which had had separate bargaining contracts. But see In re Phila-
delphia Inquirer Co., 14 N. L. . B. No. 58, Aug. 18, 1939, an earlier case in which
Leiserson and Madden denied self-determination to crafts which had previously obtained
separate bargaining contracts.
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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OF THE BLACK TOM AND
KINGSLAND CASES *
THE Treaty of Berlin,' ending the war between the United States and
Germany, reserved for future settlement all claims of American nationals
against the German Government. To insure the payment of all valid claims,
the American Government was to retain possession of all sequestered property
until Germany made suitable provision for the satisfaction of American
claims.2 Pursuant to these provisions, the Mixed Claims Commission was
established in 1922 to adjudicate the claims by arbitration." The Commission
was to consist of an American and a German commissioner and an umpire
who would be acceptable to both governments. 4 The umpire, however, was
not to be a fully empowered adjudicator; he was to decide only those points
upon which the national commissioners should disagree.
Prominent among the claims filed with the Mixed Claims Commission were
the Sabotage cases, 5 popularly known as the Black Torn and Kingsland cases,
The memorials 6 of the United States alleged that in 1916 and 1917 German
agents, intending to destroy munitions bound for the Allies, had fired the
Black Tom Terminal in New York Harbor and the Kingsland Ammunition
plant at Kingsland, New Jersey. In 1930 the Commission unanimously
decided that the claimants had not advanced sufficient proof and dismissed
the cases. 7 The following year a petition for rehearing, alleging mistakes of
law and a misunderstanding of the facts, was dismissed with the statement
that, although the rules of procedure made no provision for rehearings, the
* United States on behalf of Lehigh Valley R. R., Agency of Canadian Car & Foun-
dry Co., Ltd., and Various Underwriters v. Germany, before Mixed Claims Comm.,
United States and Germany, Docket Nos. 8103, 8117 et al., sitting under Agreement of
Aug. 10, 1922, 42 STAT. 2200, U. S. TarAT SER. 665 (1922).
1. Proclaimed Not-. 14, 1921, 42 STAT. 1939, U. S. TREATY SEa. 658 (1921).
2. Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. A.
§ 7 (App. 1928) over $500,000,000 worth of enemy property was seized by the Alien
Property Custodian.
3. The Agreement of 1922, 42 STAT. 2200, U. S. TREATY SiE. 665 (1922) was ap-
proved by the legislatures in Germany and by executive agreement in the United States.
4. The original personnel of the Commission consisted of Justice William R. Day
of the Supreme Court as umpire, Judge Edwin B. Parker as American Commissioner,
and Wilhelm Kiesselbach as German Commissioner. Judge Parker became umpire and
Chandler Anderson, American Commissioner, in 1923. Justice Roberts of the Supreme
Court was appointed umpire in March, 1932, succeeding Roland W. Boyden who had
followed Judge Parker. It is to be noted that since the establishment of the Commis-
sion, the umpire has always been an American.
5. United States on behalf of Lehigh Valley R. R., Agency of Canadian Car &
Foundry Co., Ltd., and Various Underwriters v. Germany, before Mixed Claims Comm.,
United States and Germany, Docket Nos. 8103, 8117 el al., sitting under Agreement of
Aug. 10, 1922, 42 STAT. 2200, U. S. TaAnY SER. 665 (1922).
6. The claims of private individuals espoused by their governments are generally
submitted to arbitration commissions in the form of memorials involving less formality
than claims by a government on its own behalf. See RALSToN, TE LAW AND PROCEDURE
OF INTERNATIONAL TRI1UNALS (rev. ed. 1926) § 358.
7. Opinion printed in (1931) 25 Am. J. INT. LAW 147.
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contentions had been carefully considered and found without merit.8 Another
attempt to secure a rehearing, this time on the allegation of newly discovered
evidence, failed in 1932 when the umpire, Mr. Justice Roberts of the Supreme
Court, decided that the new evidence did not justify a departure from the
original decision 9 The decision thus successfully evaded a determination of
the Commission's power to reopen their adjudications.
Undaunted by these repeated rebuffs, the claimants then tried a new tech-
nique. They moved for a reopening on the ground that the Commission had
been misled in its original decision by fraud, collusion and suppression of
evidence. Faced with these allegations, Mr. Justice Roberts declared in
1933 that since no tribunal worthy of respect could allow its decision to
stand if the charges of fraud were well founded, the cases would now be
reopened.Y0 In 1935 the American Agent filed a motion requesting that if
the allegations of fraud were substantiated, the Commission in the same
decision should determine the cases on their merits. In deference to objec-
tions by the German Commissioner, however, the Commission denied the
motion and asserted that their first decision would be limited to the question
of fraud.1
In January 1939, the evidence was at last fully presented and the issue of
fraud was submitted to the Commission for determination. WVhile the delib-
erations were still in progress, the German Commissioner resigned, alleging
bias on the part of Mr. justice Roberts. Notvithstanding the absence of any
German representative, the American Commissioner submitted a purported
certificate of disagreement to the umpire. Mr. justice Roberts' opinion,
rendered on June 15, not only upheld the charges of fraud, but also declared
that by establishing the responsibility of Germany for both fires, the claimants
had prevailed on the merits.12
8. Opinion of March 30, 1931, printed in (1933) 27 Am. J. I,,T. L.,w 339.
9. Opinion printed in (1933) 27 Ams. J. I-r. LAw 345. In this opinion Justice
Roberts found that two sets of documents, relied on heavily by the claimants, were not
authentic. One was the "Wozniak letters" indicating that the writer, one Womial, at
whose work-bench the Kingsland fire had started, consorted witth German agents in
Mfexico in 1917. The other was the "Herrmann message" written in lemon juice rn the
pages of a "pulp" magazine. The message allegedly sent by one Herrmann to one Hilhen,
both avowed German agents, mentioned the suspects of the Kingsland and Blad: Tom
cases and stated that both fires had been reported to his superior in Mexico. The maga-
zine was allegedly discovered in Hilken's attic in 1930. Germany produced evidence that
it wNas purchased after 1930 from a second-hand book store in Brooklyn, Justice Rot2rts
stated that, apart from the conflict of expert testimony, he was convinced in his own
mind as to spuriousness of the message. The message is especially noteworthy in that it
covers and dears up all the points which in the decision of 1930 had boen fuund inade-
quately proven.
10. Opinion of December 15, 1933 (mimeographed). It vas also held in this opinion
that newly discovered evidence did not provide a basis for reopening.
11. Opinion of July 29, 1935 (mimeographed). To restore the status of the cases to
that established by the original decision of 1930, the 1932 decision was set aside in 1935;
it was again stated that the merits would not be adjudicated at the first submission.
Opinion of June 3, 1936 (mimeographed).
12. Opinion of June 15, 1939 (mimeographed). The opinion contains a prior history
of the case. The opinion was written by the American Commissioner, Christopher Gar-
nett, and adopted by the umpire.
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The propriety of this reopening of the original decision of 1930 is subject
to serious question in that the Agreement of 1922, which defined the duties
and powers of the Commission, provided that "all decisions . . . shall be
accepted as final and binding upon the two governments."'13 Mr. Justice
Roberts, however, construed this provision as a covenant binding the two
governments with respect to any decision to be made, but not purporting
to define what is to be considered a "decision"; all questions of finality, he
said, were left to the Commission. But even under this interpretation, it is
difficult to accept the three attempts by the American agent to set aside the
original decision as an observance of the covenant. If the provision, under
any interpretation, permits constant efforts for nine years to reverse the first
disposition of the cases, the restriction might as well have been absent entirely.
The decision of 1933 reopening the cases raises a further question as to the
jurisdiction of the umpire. This determination was rendered by an umpire
who, by the terms of the Agreement of 1922, was to decide issues only in
the event of disagreement between the national commissioners. 14 By the
Commission's Rules of Procedure, notification of disagreement was to be
communicated to the umpire by a written certificate signed by each arbitra-
tor.15 In other arbitration proceedings, umpires have refused to entertain
petitions for rehearings which were addressed to them in the first instance,10
or did not come before them in the prescribed manner.17 The present com-
munication of disagreement consisted merely of an informal letter and opinion
of the German Commissioner expressing views opposed to the privilege to
reopen.' 8 Despite the terms of the Rules of Procedure and a previous holding
by the Umpire of the Spanish Claims Commission of 1871, that he would
not hear disputes where one arbitrator refused to certify the disagreement, 19
Mr. Justice Roberts decided to hear the issue. In justification he stated that
the Agreement said nothing of a formal means of expressing disagreement,
and that the Rules could not, by providing for formalities, "contravene the
explicit terms of the instrument." However worthy may have been his
apparent desire to prevent a permanent stalemate, the argument is uncon-
vincing that the Rules contravened the express terms of the Agreement when
in fact that instrument said nothing on the subject.
13. 42 STAT. 2200, U. S. TREATY SER. 665 (1922).
14. Ibid. In the field of private arbitration the umpire fulfills the same function.
S. J. Stewart v. Mansura Cotton Oil Mill Co., 148 So. 496 (La. App. 1933).
15. RuLEs OF PaocEVuaE, Mixed Claims Commission (ed. 1929) Art. VIII.
16. In the Weil and La Abra cases, (1876) 2 MooRE, ARBITRATIONS 1329, two awards
rendered by the Mexican Claims Commission of 1868 in favor of American claimants
were alleged to have been procured by fraud. The umpire refused rehearing. Mexico
appealed to the State Department, but did not obtain complete restitution until 1902, See
SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (1939) § 103; the cases provide
a precedent against the umpire's granting a reopening, but are hardly eloquent testimonials
to the expediency of referring the problem to the State Department.
17. (1881) 3 MOORE, ARBITRATioNs 2192.
18. The facts relating to the communication of disagreement appear in the mimeo-
graphed opinion of Dec. 15, 1933.
19. 3 MOORE, ARBITA'rIoNs 2192. This decision did not arise out of any specific
claim but on a motion by the American advocate for an order of the commission granting
his right to appear before the umpire as a matter of general procedure.
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Although the reopening may have been in conflict with the Agreement and
the Rules of Procedure, there is no denying the force of Mr. Justice Roberts'
argument that a tribunal should not defend the finality of a decision in the
face of allegations that it was induced by fraud20 Fraud is generally con-
sidered a ground sufficient to nullify an arbitral award," and of all the reasons
for permitting a reopening, fraud is the most persuasive. The allegations,
however, were only of the most general nature: fraud, collusion, and sup-
pression of evidence, all mere legal conclusions. They did not purport to
state the facts which constituted the fraud;22 yet these allegations sufficed to
keep the cases open for six more years while evidence to sustain them was
being collected. The entering of an order that the basis for the charge be
stated would have gone far towards discovering whether the allegations were
bona fide or a stall for more time.
A further issue is presented by the continuance of the cases by the American
Commissioner and the umpire after the resignation of the German Com-
missioner. The opinion of 1939 cites Colombia v. Cauca Companyea as au-
thority for the procedure adopted, but the circumstances in that case had
little in common with the present situation. In the Cauca case a commission
of three had been established to arbitrate issues arising out of a railroad
concession. After the trial, when only the formal signing of the award re-
mained, the Colombian Commissioner resigned. Since the Commission's legal
existence expired in seven more days, there was no time for the formalities
of appointing a successor, and the award was signed by the two remaining
commissioners. The procedure was ratified by the Supreme Court, which
held that a part, could not so defeat the purposes of the arbitration by with-
drawing its representative at the last minute. The element which necessitated
the amended procedure in the Cauca case was not present in the Sabotage
cases, however, since there was no set date for the termination of the Mixed
Claims Commission. The procedure set forth in the Agreement for the
appointment of a successor should therefore have been followed, leaving the
problems of treaty observance within the province of the State Department.
20. In private law, fraud sufficient to set aside a judgment of a court must ha e.-
trinsic and collateral to matters directly involved in the suit. Perjury is considered
intrinsic and is not sufficient. Adams v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) 246, 44 P. (2d) 572 (1935) ;
State ex reL Adam et aL v. Martin, 193 Ind. 516, 154 N. E. 284 (1926) ; Vacuum Oil Co.
v. Brett, 150 Okla. 153, 300 Pac. 632 (1931). In the field of private arbitration there is
a conflict of authority as to whether an award can be attacked for intrinsic fraud. The
cases are collected in Jacobowitz v. Metselaar, 268 N. Y. 130, 197 N. E. 169, (1935),
99 A. L. R. 1198, 1202 (adopting the same rule for avwards as for judgments and refus-
ing to set aside avard on grounds of perjury).
21. CAmPsro,, TnE NurLrrs oF ImmnxaAoNAL Annrrws Aw, nns (Unpublished
thesis in Yale Law School Library, 1933) 121.
22. In private arbitration, to justify consideration of the impeachment of an award
on the grounds of fraud, the facts alleged to constitute fraud must be stated. General
allegations will not suffice. McMullen v. Lewis, 32 F. (2d) 4S1 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929),
cert. denied, 280 U. S. 566 (1929) ; Thompson v. Edvwards, 220 Ky. 239, 294 S. W. 1095
(1927); Eubank v. Bostick, 194 S. W. 214 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1917).
23. 190 U. S. 524 (1903).
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It must be conceded that obstructionist tactics are not to be encouraged,
but the means adopted to defeat them can not depart from the instrument
from which a commission derives its powers. Unlike the commission in the
Cauca case, which was composed of three members empowered to render a
majority award, the Mixed Claims Commission has but two members, with
an umpire to be called in only if the deliberations result in disagreement.
Since the resignation here took place while the deliberations were still in
progress, a certification, however informal, that the deliberations culminated
in disagreement, was impossible. To avoid these difficulties, the Rules of
Procedure treated so cavalierly in the opinion in 1933 were now invoked.
For reasons of expediency in the event of a disagreement, the Rules had been
changed in 1929 to provide that the umpire should sit with the commissioners
and participate in the hearings.24 It was decided, therefore, that by these
amended Rules the Commission was rendered a commission of three, em-
powered to render a majority award. The Rules of Procedure were thereby
permitted to change the structure of the Commission as established by the
Agreement of 1922, although it had previously been decided in 1933 that
the Rules could not contravene the agreement. Although rendered unneces-
sary if the umpire was now a commissioner, a certificate of disagreement
was nevertheless filed, but oddly enough the Rules did not maintain their
newly-found importance; for again, as in 1933, the certificate was signed
only by the American Commissioner rather than by both as required by the
Rules. 25
It will be remembered that, despite statements in two prior opinions that
the Commission would at present consider only the issue of fraud, the opinion
of 1939 decided not only this issue, but also that the claimants had prevailed
on the merits. Justification for this change was found by stating that the
1936 opinion held that fraud would be the only issue "unless Germany shall
agree to a different course"; it was now asserted such an agreement had in
fact been made. It had been Germany's position that even if the fraud were
established, the original decision dismissing the claims should not be set aside
unless the claimants' proof was adequate to change the result. To bolster
such proof as already existed, more evidence on the merits was therefore
filed by the claimants. Germany, as would be expected, also filed evidence
seeking to keep the American proof in its doubtful state. This was fatal, as
it was held that the filing of evidence by Germany other than on the issue
of fraud was an agreement to a different course, and the question of fraud
would no longer be isolated. Germany's counterfiling to the voluminous
evidence of the claimants thus became an "agreement" by her to abandon her
insistence that the merits of the cases not be discussed at the first submission.
It is not feasible, of course, to comment on the merits of the cases, but in
finding that the Commission had been misled by fraud in 1930, this body
admitted to a greater naivet6 than the facts justified. Even then the Com-
24. This procedure enables the umpire, though he may never be called on to render
the deciding opinion, to familiarize himself with a case and saves recommunication of a
case to him in the event of disagreement by the arbitrators.
25. RULES OF PR0OMURE, Mixed Claims Commission (ed. 1929) Art. VIII.
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mission had been perfectly clear on two points: first, that during American
neutrality, a general sabotage campaign existed in this country,- although the
proof was inadequate to establish the specific cases, and second, that some
of the witnesses on both sides were cranks and perjurers. - Although the
Commission in 1930 had not been misled on these points, Germany's denial
of this sabotage campaign was now a ground of fraud which had deceived
the Commission in its original decision. In addition, although the Commis-
sion in 1930 had recognized much of the German testimony as suspect, -2 the
Commission was now said to have been deceived in its decision by perjury.
Finally on the merits, new evidence, held not to constitute grounds for reopen-
ing in 1933, convinced the Commission that this time the American case was
made out.
Irrespectivd of any question on the facts, the procedure adopted in reaching
the conclusion was ill-advised and unfortunate for the general cause of inter-
national arbitration. Germany has filed a protest with the State Department,
and the award is now being collaterally attacked by other claimants, on the
ground that it was rendered without jurisdiction.- These claimants, who
were only partially paid on their own awards, are seeking an injunction
against disbursing funds sequestered in the Treasury to the sabotage claim-
ants. 0 Whatever the results of these attacks may be, the 'Mixed Claims
Commission has ended its labors in an atmosphere of strife and ill-feehing
which goes far towards nullifying the excellent and harmonious record estab-
lished in other cases.31
26. In the opinion of 1930 printed in (1931) 25 Ai. J. I:;T. LAw 147, the Commis-
sion, referring to the sabotage policy says at page 149: "We see no evidence in thece
cases, however, that such authority as the political section of the General Staff gave was
ever modified." And at 158: "We can be sure, however, that any German agent fee!ing
for a chance to destroy munitions would have looked upon Black Tom with the Leenest
interest."
27. Id. at 151: "Hilken and Herrmann are both liars, not presumptive but pruven."
and at 154: "Wozniak has shown in connection with matters having nothing to do with
the fire that he would not let a little thing like truth stand in his v.ay."
28. See notes 26 and 27 supra.
29. Zimmerman and Forshay Assets Realization Corp. v. Cordell Hull, Sc'y of
State, and Henry Morgenthau, Sec'y of Treasury, N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1939, p. 2, col. 1.
30. The sabotage claims with interest come to around $50,000,000. About $24,000,0 0
remains in the German Special Deposit Account. The great part of the original property
in the hands of the Alien Property Custodian has been returned to nationals of the former
enemies under the Settlement of War Claims Act, 45 STAT. 254 (1923), 50 U. S. C. A.
§ 9 (App. 1928). Other claimants have also received payments on their aw:ards.
31. See KiEsSELAcH, PROBLEMIS OF THE GErtLx.% A!,rmnc.A., Cr.As Coxnisslo::
(1930); Fehr, Av4rrican and German WVor Clains Settled (1933) 18 A. B. A. J. S96.
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TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS ON TAX-EXEMPT FEDERAL
SECURITIES*
MANIFOLD considerations, social and economic, have led courts in recent
years to whittle away at constitutional principles 1 and statutory clauses 2
which once sufficed to exemipt federal security issues from taxation. In cur-
tailing the area of exemption, judges have displayed considerable ingenuity;
perhaps because the device of tax exemption is a two-edged sword, which
enhances the marketability of favored securities but reduces the potential
efficacy of future revenue acts; perhaps because it smacks of inequality a8
in a day when federal issues are commonly oversubscribed in spite of narrow
exemptions and low interest rates. A recent decision by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, that capital gains from sale or
redemption of federal land bank bonds are not taxable as income, stands out
against this current trend.4 The court, in reaching its conclusion, which
affects the exemption of capital gains on more than a billion dollars of bonds
now in private hands,5 worked through a tangle of statutory interpretation
* Stewart v. United States, 106 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
1. Although the Supreme Court has not had occasion during this period to rule
explicitly on state taxation of federal bonds, it has displayed an increasing tendency to
restrict the implied immunity of federal instrumentalities, sprung from McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819) to cases where perceptible economic interference
is created by state taxation, and has looked sharply to be certain that the Government
itself is the party in interest. Compare the Court's reasoning in Gillespie v. Oklahoma,
257 U. S. 501 (1922) ; Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136 (1927); Mac-
Allen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620 (1929) with that in Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938) ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134
(1937); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932); Educational Films Corp. v.
Ward, 282 U. S. 379 (1931). Treatment by the Court of the analogous state immunity
has revealed an even more explicit change of attitude. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S.
405 (1938).
2. The power of Congress to exempt specified federal bonds from any and all taxa-
tion has not been seriously questioned, but ambiguous statutory clauses have been con-
strued to deny exemptions where possible. Lawrence C. Phipps, 34 B.T.A. 641 (1936),
aff'd, 91 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937) ; Edgar A. Igleheart, 28 B.T.A, 888 (1933),
aff'd, 77 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 14 F. Supp. 541 (Ct. Cf. 1936); Hamersley v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 768
(Ct. Cl. 1936).
3. Lowndes, Taxing the Income from Tax-Excmpt Securities (1938) 32 ILL. L. Rv.
643, and Shultz, Tax Exemption of Governmental Securities (1939) 17 TAX MAG. 331,
are interesting discussions of the economic and social issues involved.
4. Stewart v. United States, 106 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939). The Board of
Tax Appeals five months before this decision denied Stewart's contention in a similar
case which was not appealed to the Circuit Court nor mentioned in its opinion. Agri-
cultural Securities Corp. et aL., 39 B.T.A. No. 157, May 25, 1939.
5. On December 31, 1937, the value of bonds outstanding was $1,867,232,080, of
which $862,329,840-worth was held by the Farm Credit Administration. MooDY's MAN-
UAL oF INvEsTmENTs (1938) 2282. No estimate of the amount of capital gains currently
being realized by dealings in these bonds is available. The volume, however, has been
great enough to engage Congressional attention. See infra note 6.
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unaided by a single precedent even remotely in point, since the exempting
phrase in question had never been construed in its 23 years of existence.
From 1916 to 1938, bonds of federal land banks were issued under a statute
which exempted bonds "and the income derived therefrom" from federal,
state, municipal and local taxation.0 Until 1932 no effort was made to levy
income tax on capital gains which arose from sales of the bonds. Beginning
with an order of 1932, however, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
required income tax payments on such gains in the hands of privrate owners.8
The order was issued in the absence of any judicial construction of the
exempting phrase, but was the product of reasoning employed by the Supreme
Court in Willcutts v. Bunn,9 a case dealing solely with the constitutionality
of a tax on capital gains. As developed in the principal case, the Government
took the position that capital gains, generally, are derived at least in part
from a course of dealing in the market, in contrast, for example, to the deriva-
tion of interest payments, which may be said to accrue by reason of passive
ownership alone. This view of the nature of capital gains is set forth in the
Bunn case, where its determination was an essential one to support the
decision reached: that a tax on capital gains realized in the sale of municipal
bonds is not a tax on ownership of the bonds but one on the act of sale. If,
in the Bwnn case, capital gains had been regarded as derived from the bonds
themselves, the Court apparently felt that the taxing statute would be an
unconstitutional burden on the function of state government.,
The judicial technique exhibited in Villcults v. Bun, has been a popular
one. In a wide variety of situations where taxation seemed apparently pro-
hibited, the courts have with microscopic discrimination shaded a line between
6. 39 STAT. 380 (1916), 12 U. S. C. §931 (1934). Section 26 reads: ". . . farm
loan bonds issued under the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed and held instrumen-
talities of the Government of the United States, and as such they and the income derived
therefrom shall be exempt from Federal, State, municipal, and local taationY'
An amendment of 1938, 52 STAT. 57S, 12 U. S. C. § 931 (a) (1938), effective as to
bonds issued after its passage, provides exemption for interest but not for other forms
of income. This amendment, apparently, does not remove the exemption of "income
derived therefrom" granted by the Farm Loan Act, insofar as it prohibits state, muni-
cipal or local taxation.
7. Whether because capital gains were uniformly considered exempt, uniformly
taxed, or simply were not an important enough source of income to challenge inquiry dos
not appear, but published records of the Treasury are barren of any construction of the
question. Individual land banks, the Federal Farm Loan Board, and private investment
houses issued many circulars advertising that the bonds "and the income derived there-
from" were exempt, but none raised the issue of capital gains. Circular No. 9. issued by
the Federal Farm Loan Board under date of May 15, 1918, for example, included the
statement: "It will be noted that this exemption is complete, and that in addition to the
exemption from State, city, and local taxation, the bonds are free from normal and addi-
tional Federal income tax and need not be included in income tax returns."
8. A telegraphic decision of March 8, 1932 instructed the Collector at San Fran-
cisco to levy income tax on capital gains from land bank bonds. Stew.art v. United States,
Record on Appeal, No. 9100 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 5.
9. 282 U. S. 216 (1931).
10. See Willcutts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 227 (1931).
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a tax on property and a tax on the privilege of alienation. 1 The exempting
clause of the Land Bank Act itself has not been sufficient to bar an estate
tax on the privilege of transferring land bank bonds at death.' 2 The Com-
missioner was, therefore, not without authority in regarding income derived
from sale or redemption in a category different from that accruing to passive
ownership.
However, even in the absence of binding precedent, judicial trends take
secondary place in a decision which must depend primarily on a determination
of what Congress intended in legislation now two decades old. 13 The actual
intent of Congress remains, in this instance as in most, conjectural' 14 - if not
completely fictional.' 5 Yet the subsequent legislative history of the exempting
clause gives hint of some meaning.
Congress made no change in the clause from 1916 until enactment of an
amendment in 1938 which removed the privilege except as to interest on all
bonds subsequently issued.10 Such a change is some evidence of a view in
11. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 (1900); United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 98 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Lawrence C. Phipps, 34 B.T.A.
641 (1936), aff'd, 91 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937); Hamersley v. United States,
16 F. Supp. 768 (Ct. Cl. 1936); Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,
14 F. Supp. 541 (Ct. Cl. 1936) ; Hubert de Stuers, 26 B.T.A. 201 (1932). An analogous
technique, employed to defeat exemption, is exemplified in Hale v. State Board of As-
sessment and Review, 302 U. S. 95 (1937), where a state statute exempting bonds "from
all taxes" was not sufficient to prohibit state income tax on interest therefrom.
12. Edgar A. Igleheart, 28 B.T.A. 888 (1933), aff'd, 77 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 5th,
1935).
13. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253, 258 (193').
14. The only specific indication of Congressional intent which the circuit court in the
principal case was able to elicit from the Farm Loan Act was the use of the word, "in-
terest" six times in Section 22, which may suggest a broader meaning for "incopie
derived therefrom" in Section 26. Stewart v. United States, 106 F. (2d) 405, 408 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1939). However, the somewhat sophisticated view of the origin of capital gains,
expressed judicially for the first time 18 years later in the Bunn case, without affirmative
evidence can hardly be attributed to Congress at the time of enactment. In its absence,
the primary meaning of "income derived therefrom" as opposed to "both as to principal
and interest"-used the following year in legislation creating Liberty bond exemption,
40 STAT. 35 (1917), 31 U. S. C. § 746 (1934), seems sufficient to include capital gains. In
reference to contentions of this kind, the majority in Agricultural Securities Corp. el al.,
38 B.T.A. No. 157, May 25, 1939, urged (at p. 5) that the meaning of "income derived
therefrom" might be broader than "interest" yet not include capital gains since it would
include "dividends, rent, and similar items" which might be paid over to bondholders by
a receiver. Almost certainly, however, such payments would be classified as interest; the
case cited by the Board does not indicate otherwise.
The bonds were offered for sale above par. N. Y. Times, July 3, 1917, p. 12, col. 7.
Original purchasers, therefore, were not in a position to contemplate capital gains and
their exemption, it can be argued, was not an important factor in marketability. Yet it
does not follow, in the light of the publicity value of "complete" exemption, that the exclu-
sion of capital gains from taxation would have had no reasonable motivation in Congress;
nor is it safe to assume that the intention of legislators expressed in exemption statutes
is confined to rational calculation.
15. Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870.
16. 52 STAT. 578, 12 U. S. C. § 931 (a) (1938), cited supra note 6.
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Congress that the exemption of capital gains, now become undesirable, had
until the amendment a very real existence. The Congressional committee
which framed the amendment seems to have so thought.17 Moreover, while
Congress deleted the contested phrase from the Farm Loan Act, at the same
session it exempted bonds issued by the Commodity Credit Corporation "and
the income derived therefrom" from all taxation. 8 It is difficult to explain
such action except on the hypothesis that Congress meant to grant a different
exemption from that of interest only in the Farm Loan Act. And certainly
re-enactment makes doubly doubtful any claim that amendment of the Act
was made to clarify a previously misunderstood intention rather than to
change the status of bonds thenceforward issued. Even after 1932 the Bureau
of Internal Revenue itself construed the exempting clause broadly, while
contending for a narrow reading. General Counsel for the Bureau ruled in 1933
and 1935 that the disputed words were sufficient to exempt capital gains on
deals in land bank bonds by land banks themselves. 19 No statutory basis for
17. The first draft, the Committee explained to the Senate, "subjected to Federal in-
come taxation capital gains realized by a joint stock land bank on obligations issuwd and
mortgages made by it after the date of enactment of the act" 83 ComG. REc. 5174 (1933).
In its report the Committee had said: "Under the Federal Farm Lan Act . . .which
governs the ta-xability of obligations of joint stock land banks, such income is enempt.
The Committee is of the opinion that such income ought to be taxed."' SE:.. RE. No.
1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 47. No mention was made of capital gains in the hands
of private investors. An amendment to this first draft was proposed by Senator King
of the Finance Committee, "to broaden and amplify the provision" 83 Co:x. Rsc. 4959
(1938). "The effect of the amendment is not only to tax that gain but also to tax¢ gain
realized ...by an individual . . . Thus, gain on a sale of such a joint stcl: land ban]:
bond by an investor is subject to tax. The amendment continues the present pruvision of
law under which interest on such bonds and mortgages is exempt from Federal taxation"
83 CONG. RF 5174 (1938).
If Congress believed that the exempting phrase had been correctly construed as to
capital gains in the hands of individuals, no reason appears for the second draft, for the
first alone would have corrected the Bureau's rulings (cited infra note 19) Xwhich con-
strued the exemption to apply to capital gains by land banks alone. Nor can it be satis-
factorily argued that the second draft was intended to spell out Congressional opinion
as to the inclusion or exclusion of capital gains in the phrase "income derived there-
from"; for Congress did not indicate its construction of the phrase, choosing instead to
declare only that capital gains, whether derived from the bond or not, would be consid-
ered gross income under the revenue acts (see supra note 6). So far as the amendment
-as concerned, capital gains remained exempt from state, local and municipal taxation
as income derived from the bond within the Act of 1916. The enlarged amendment is,
therefore, explicable only on the ground that Congress believed capital gains in private
hands were exempt under the terms of the 1916 Statute and wished to remove that
exemption.
18. 52 STAT. 107 (1938).
19. General Counsel's Memorandum 11,726, unpublished. Under date of April 3, 1933,
counsel stated, in part, referring to a case involving the Des Moines Joint Stoel: Land
Bank: "Section 26 of the Federal Farm Loan Act specifically exempts Federal land
banks and national farm loan associations from Federal, State, municipal and local ta:a-
tion, except taxes upon real estate held. The exemption specifically applies to the capital
and reserve or surplus and 'the income derived therefrom'. The words 'income derived
therefrom' as there used have been interpreted by the Bureau to mean any gains or
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distinguishing between different classes of owners, so far as the exemption
goes, is set forth in the Bureau's memoranda construing the Act, These
indications of intent are to some degree offset by the fact that revenue mea-
sures from 1921 onward specifically exempted from taxation only interest
from land bank bonds, making no mention of other forms of "income derived
therefrom."' 20  Such an omission is, of course, not sufficient to repeal the
previous specific exemption, and it is only some evidence of a lack of Con-
gressional intent to exempt capital gains. 21
In the face of these indicia of legislative desire, the Bunn case becomes a
somewhat slender reed upon which to lean. 22 Concerned with an implied
constitutional exemption of capital gains on municipal bonds, it has little
relevance to construction of a specific statutory exemption in a case where
no problem of interference with sovereign power is involved. Language in
the opinion, relied on to sustain the Government's claim that capital *gains
are not derived from the bond, does not go that far. The Supreme Court
realistically pointed out that capital gain is the final product of at least three
factors, "the creation of capital, industry, and skill,"2 3 leaving no doubt that
one factor is the bond itself. A literal application of this view to the exempting
statute calls at most for segregation of capital gain into taxable and non-
taxable proportions, since the operative clause forbids taxation of that portion
derived from the bond. The economic absurdity of such a calculation emipha-
sizes the fallacy of applying general language in a remote case to decisions
which must be primarily concerned with the meaning of words in a specific
context of time and circumstance. Moreover, the status of capital gains in
the Bunn case, as of 1931, is relevant only so far as it is some evidence of
current significance of the term in question, to be weighed in the balance with
indications of contemporary Congressional intent. Certainly the inferences
profits derived from dealings in capital and reserve or surplus. In the same paragraph
of the same section, farm loan bonds and the 'income derived therefrom' arc exempted.
It would be inconsistent to define the words 'income derived therefrom' found in the
third line of section 26, to include profits or gains, while at the same time defining the
same words ,found in the tenth line of the same section, to include only interest . . .
Under such circumstances, it is the opinion of this office that the income so derived, was
derived from the bonds as contemplated by the Federal Farm Loan Act." But sec asser-
tion of counsel for the Bureau in a ruling on the claim advanced in the principal case.
Stewart v. United States, Record on Appeal, No. 9100 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 106.
20. For example, INT. REv. CODE § 22 (a) and (b) for 1928 defines gross income as
"gains, profits, and income derived from . . . sales or dealings in property . . ." and
excludes only "interest upon . . . securities issued under provision of the Federal Farm
Loan Act . . ." from that definition.
21. The Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1937 ruled that specific language of the
Railroad Retirement Act, 49 STAT. 967 (1935), 45 U. S. C. § 2881 (Supp. 1938), which
provided that "no annuity shall be . . . subject to any tax . . . under any circumstances
whatsoever . . ." was sufficient to exempt such annuities from the income tax, although
the Revenue Act [INT. REv. CODE § 22(b) (2)] provided that amounts received as an
annuity . . . shall be included in gross income." I. T. 3069, 1937-1 CuM. BuLL. 59.
22. The Board of Tax Appeals relied heavily upon it. Agricultural Securities Corp.
et al., 39 B.T.A. No. 157, May 25, 1939.
23. 282 U. S. 216, 228 (1931).
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to be drawn from Willcutts v. Buioz are not in accord with subsequent Con-
gressional wording of the Commodity Credit Act2 4 and with the Bureau's
own rulings as to the status of capital gains in the hands of land banks,2 all
later in time than the Buon decision.
That tax exemptions of the type in question are in most cases now no
longer desirable or necessary for the sale of federal obligations seems well
settled. But whether Congress was of such mind in 1916 and again in 1938
is not so clear. In so close a decision as that presented by the principal case,
it may well be that questions of policy are legitimately determinate. If so,
the climate of judicial opinion in regard to tax-exempt securities, as well as
political considerations, must have made the Government's contentions tempt-
ing ones to the courts which heard them. Short of giving decisive effect,
however, to some such social estimate, the circuit court was in no position
to reach any other conclusion than the one at which it arrived.
MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURE IN EXCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEBT LIMITATION*
PRESSURE on cities to spend for relief and public improvement, at a time
when revenues are reduced,1 makes for unbalanced budgets and increased
municipal borrowing.2 In most states this problem is further complicated by
the presence of debt limitations.3 Courts tend to be strict in construing these
limitations,4 and, as a general rule, strike down contracts which overreach
the constitutional quota. Yet occasions have arisen, in recent years especially,
when judges have been moved by urgent circumstances to seek and find loop-
holes in constitutional prohibitions.3
24. 52 STAT. 107 (1938), cited supra note 18.
25. General Counsel's 'Memorandum, cited supra note 19.
* Columbia Insurance Co. v. Board of Education, 91 P. (2d) 736 (Okla. 1939).
1. 'Municipal income, derived mainly from the property tax, varies in direct propor-
tion to real estate prices. WHAT TnE DEPRassIoN HAs DONE: TO CITIES (Ridley & Nolt-
ing eds. 1935); Mucipal Debt Defaults, PcB. Aw!i.N. SERv. No. 33 (1933) 3, 9. Of
course, even in years economically normal, a critical shortage of funds may occur through
careless budgeting, or tax delinquencies, or an unpredictable expense.
2. HmL0HoUSE, 1MUNIciPAL BONDS (1936) Table XXXIII, 426.
3. Thirty-one states have constitutional debt limits, while there are statutory limits
in 13 others. See INsTIT=ra OF M UN cIPAL LAW OFFICRS, REP. NO. 36 (1938).
4. Smith v. Broderick, 107 Cal. 644, 40 Pac. 1033 (1395); Logansport v. Jordan,
171 Ind. 121, 85 N. E. 959 (1908); Pepper v. Philadelphia, 181 Pa. 566, 37 At. 579
(1897).
5. Debt incurred to supply water, light, sewage and recreation areas may be treated
as a class of borrowing not controlled by the debt limitations. Allison v. PhoeniN, 44
Ariz. 66, 33 P. (2d) 927 (1934). The validity of a loan "within revenue"' may be calcu-
lated, not by expected income, but by the greatest amount Which might constitutionally
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Recently the Oklahoma Supreme Court invoked a new doctrine of municipal
privilege to enforce a contract in which a municipality had incurred forbidden
debt. 6 The case involved the insurance of some school buildings by a policy
purchased by a municipality on credit. It is stated in the court's opinion
that the contract constituted an "invalid charge against the school district";
but when the school burned, before any premium had been paid, the court
gave judgment on the contract against the insurance company.
This case could have been disposed of by the court on grounds of simple
contract, in which the promise by the company to insure was enforceable by
reason of consideration moving from a party other than the promisee ;7 for
by a state statute, any municipal officer contracting to spend beyond his legal
allowance is personally subject to suit for the payment promised in behalf
of the municipality.8 That right of action was known to both parties,0 and
when created here for the insurer it was a valid consideration for the promise
to indemnify the school district in the event of loss by fire. If the case were
treated in this context, no issue of illegal debt need have arisen.
But the court did not think of the matter in these terms. The argument
used cited a number of cases in which municipalities were defendants in actions
for goods delivered under contracts violating the constitutional prohibition.
In these cases the Oklahoma court has held that defendants need not pay
the price promised for purchased materials, and yet could, nevertheless, keep
the materials. 10 This favored status as defendant, in illegal contract suits,
was extended in the principal case to situations in which the municipality is
plaintiff, the court holding that promises made to the city are enforceable
although the city's promise to pay is invalid. Thus consideration becomes
immaterial. In this novel statement of the law, the city takes on a privileged
stature, and for this class of cases becomes, somewhat like states, a party
able to sue who yet remains beyond reach of suit." The result is, for the
have been raised. Franklin v. Dayton, 269 Ky. 484, 107 S. W. (2d) 338 (1937). Debt
which is to be repaid only from a special fund is not included within the limitation provi-
sions. Baker v. Carter, 165 Okla. 116, 25 P. (2d) 747 (1933) ; Garret v. Swanton, 216
Cal. 220, 13 P. (2d) 725 (1932). A presumption of the validity of a bond issue may
overcome a prima facie case of excessive debt. Faught v. Sapulpa, 145 Okla. 164, 292
Pac. 15 (1930). Loans within the year's revenue may be allowed as "anticipating revenue"
even though, in fact, repayment from the year's funds is improbable. Eyer v. Old Forge
Borough, 309 Pa. 81, 163 Atl. 156 (1932). Delinquent taxes may be anticipated by fund-
able short term loans even though collection may require legal proceedings beyond the
current year. Shuldice v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 28, 95 Atl. 938 (1915).
6. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, 91 P. (2d) 736 (Okla. 1939).
7. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS (1932) § 75.
8. OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) §2509.
9. The court states: "It (the insurance company) assumed said contractual liability
with full knowledge of the law and the facts." Columbia Ins. Co. v. Board of Educa-
tion, 91 P. (2d) 736, 738 (Okla. 1939).
10. Board of McCurtain Cty. v. Western Bank & Office Supply Co., 122 Okla. 244,
254 Pac. 741 (1926) ($22,000 worth of office supplies) ; J. B. Klein Iron & Foundry Co.
v. Board, 178 Okla. 72, 61 P. (2d) 1055 (1936) (bridge materials); Fairbanks-Morse
Co. v. Geary, 59 Okla. 22, 157 Pac. 720 (1916) (machinery rented for a year).
11. National Surety Co. v. State Banking Board, 49 Okla. 184, 152 Pac. 389 (1915).
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purposes of the debt provisions, that the city may make what contracts it
can persuade innocent parties to enter, and enforce them without fulfilling
its own promise to pay. A contractor realizes only the frequently worthless
right to sue the municipal officers personally.Y
Assuming the validity of debt-limitation as a basic principle, it would seem
that occasionally necessary circumvention could be founded on a less revo-
lutionary theory. One such approach could be made through equitable
estoppel. The facts in the instant case indicate that the insurance company
knew of the invalidity of their insurance agreement, and yet had taken bene-
fits from it, first by reason of the school board's promise to pay, which prob-
ably would have been performed, and secondly through the right of action
acquired against the board officers. Had no fire occurred, the insurer was
willing and able to collect his premium. 13 It would certainly seem that a
participating party, so implicated in a contract, should not be permitted, even
though the agreement was still in a purely executory state,14 to escape liability
by arguing that the contract was not lawful.
The estoppel is more securely established by the school board's reliance
on the policy.15 Once assured of this right of indemnity, the officers made no
other efforts to protect themselves against loss by fire, although means were
at hand. They might have arranged a special election to endorse the loan in
question, or have collected the premium money informally. Since the board,
in reliance on the insurer's promise, forsook such efforts to protect its in-
vestment, the company could not now disclaim responsibility for the loss
suffered. Thus a bar would be raised to the defense of illegality; and once
the city has paid its premium, the contract would be enforceable without
raising the constitutional issue. However, there are patent dangers in the
estoppel theory. Although parties contracting with the city are irrevocably
committed once the city has consented to an agreement, there would still be
no guarantee that taxpayers would not sue to enjoin payment"' after the
cify had received benefit. Thus, while estoppel is a handy device to prevent
unscrupulous dealers from abusing tax-payers, it would afford no solution to
the inequity which permits unscrupulous municipalities to escape fulfillment
of their promises by interposing the excuse of constitutional limitation on
expenditure.
12. See Board of McCurtain Cty. v. Western Bank & Office Supply "Co., 122 Olda.
244, 250, 254 Pac. 741, 745 (1926).
13. The assessment which the board agreed to make was in fact arranged. The
company agent had discussed the problem with board officials, and knew both the means
to be used, and the likelihood of success.
14. In Hugenot 'Mills v. Jempson & Co., 6S S. C. 363, 47 S. E. 6S7 (1903) a cor-
poration sued to enforce a contract made by its ultra vires partnership, and recovered the
price of goods not yet delivered because the vendee x"as estopped from raising the ultra
vires issue. A very similar ruling may be made on the theory that the state alone is
entitled to raise the ultra vires issue to void a contract. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 40
(1906).
15. RESTATEmEN"r, Co.N-racrs (1932) §90.
16. Marlow v. School District, 29 Okla.304, 116 Pac. 797 (1911); Faught v. SapuIpa,
145 Okla. 164, 292 Pac. 15 (1930).
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A second theory of the case could be found in a rule of construction which
is applicable both in constitutional and statutory interpretation. 1 Strict pro-
hibitions are sometimes ignored, when enforcement would seriously injure
the very interest a provision is intended to protect.1 8 This approach to the
present case would mean that the court would decline to enforce a consti-
tutional provision designed to relieve taxpayers, because enforcement would
injure them by invalidating this insurance contract. The cost of new school
buildings being too heavy for the district taxpayers to carry, a contract of
indemnity is the reasonable escape from the risk.' 9 Because of their harmony
with the purpose and spirit of debt limitations, some agreements can be justi-
fied by this rule without imposing a harsh burden on dealers.20 Yet the concept
is so narrow that many an eminently desirable contract would still be illegal,
because it could not be traced to reduction in the cost load. 2'
Still a third theory of the case is advanced in a few Oklahoma decisions
which excuse borrowing beyond legal limits whenever required to carry on
essential functions of government. 2  It has been held that a credit quota may
be exceeded to pay government officials, 23 or to feed prisoners,21 or to serve
process, 25 because the constitution requires public protection and basic services
to continue. It has been suggested by the court that public education is one
of the things "absolutely necessary . . . under any humane and modern system
17. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted the principle that its constitution and
statutes are equally to be construed in the light of their intended scope. DeHasque v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 68 Okla. 183, 173 Pac. 73 (1918).
18. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Pollock, 181 Okla. 266, 73 P. (2d) 427
(1937); similarly in Kirk v. High, 169 Ark. 152, 273 S. W. 389 (1925) the Arkansas
court refused to enforce a constitutional mandate against all debt, because that was not
intended to apply to the construction of court houses and jails. See also School Dist. of
Pontiac v. City of Pontiac, 262 Mich. 338, 247 N. W. 474 (1933).
19. A trustee, faced with the possibility of a heavy loss, may, without specific instruc-
tion, indemnify against such loss and charge the trust funds for this purpose. RESTATE-
mENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 176; Stamford Trust Co. v. Mack, 91 Conn. 620, 101 Atd. 235
(1917). The public official in charge of public property is frequently analogized to the
trustee. Andrews v. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309 (1872) ; Topeka v. Stahl, 86 Kan. 681, 121 Pac.
910 (1912).
20. In Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15, 17 N. E. 587 (1888), this theory was
used in permitting a contract to hire lawyers or other agents to contest the validity of
city debt or to secure its reduction, although initially it involved added expense.
21. J. B. Klein Iron & Foundry Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 172 Okla. 72, 46 P. (2d)
340 (1936) (replacement of a washed out bridge); Fairbanks-Morse Co. v. City of
Geary, 59 Okla. 22, 157 Pac. 720 (1916) (water equipment) ; Board of McCurtain Cty. v.
Western Bank & Office Supply Co., 122 Okla. 244, 254 Pac. 741 (1926) (courthouse
furnishings).
22. Hume v. Wyand, 68 Okla. 261, 173 Pac. 813 (1918) ; Pilling v. Everett, 67 Wash.
109, 120 Pac. 873 (1912). In some states a doctrine of emergency justification for muni-
cipal expenditure exists. Snyder v. Hylan, 105 Misc. 78, 173 N. Y. S. 366 (1918) ; Phila-
delphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Directors of Poor, 311 Pa. 236, 166 Atd. 772
(1933).
23. In re Application of State to Issue Bonds, 33 Okla. 797, 127 Pac. 1065 (1912).
24. Smart, Sheriff v. Board of Craig County, 67 Okla. 141, 169 Pac. 1101 (1917).
25. Anderson v. Board of Pittsburgh Cty., 134 Okla. 299, 273 Pac. 222 (1928).
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of government."2 If the principle were so extended, the field of education
would present certain inherent costs which would obligate the municipal
treasury, even though in excess of the budget. Among these, the preservation
of educational equipment could be included; and it would be permissible for
officers to insure such property when prudent to do so.- It is a theory suffi-
ciently limited to prevent abuse, in that only reasonably necessary expenses
are permitted, and those only in certain fields of service which can be called
essential. Yet the rule adds a flexibility to the debt limit which permits
enforcement of contracts when crisis or accident compels unbudgeted action
by the municipality; and agreements in this guise would work no hardship
on the dealers involved.
In the light of the recurring need for overstepping municipal debt margins,
which courts seem compelled to permit, it would appear inequitable to adopt
a theory like municipal privilege as used in the principal case, or the sug-
gested contract rationale, which would allow a dealer to recover only against
the city officers. These doctrines divert the cost burden of approved public
policy to a few private purses. In the alternative, estoppel offers only partial
security to dealers, while a constitutional construction which allows economi-
cal contracts permits too few exceptions. A more complete solution lies in
the concept which permits courts to endorse whatever expenditure the essential
functions of government require.
26. In re Application of State to Issue Bonds, 33 Okla. 797, 801, 127 Pac. 1055,
1066 (1912).27. See note 19 supra.
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